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CHIEF JUSTICE WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT’S 
CONCEPTION OF JUDICIAL INTEGRITY:  
THE LEGAL HISTORY OF TUMEY V. OHIO 
JOSHUA KASTENBERG* 
ABSTRACT 
In 1927, Chief Justice William Howard Taft led a unanimous Court to determine 
that, at minimum, the right to an impartial and independent judiciary meant that the 
judge had to lack a personal interest in the outcome of the trial. While the decision, 
Tumey v. Ohio, was based on a judge’s pecuniary interest, it was also part of Taft’s 
efforts to ensure that the nation’s judges, from the municipal courts to the Supreme 
Court had the public’s confidence in their integrity. Tumey, therefore, is not simply a 
decision on pecuniary interests. It can, and should, be applied to judicial elections, 
including the financing of elections and limits on election speech, as well as a judge’s 
association or relationships with the litigants. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On March 7, 1927, Chief Justice William Howard Taft wrote his younger brother 
Horace Taft, “I am going to deliver an opinion this morning in a very important alcohol 
prohibition act matter in Ohio.”1 Taft went on to explain that the Supreme Court’s 
decision did not address whether the so-called Volstead Act, which implemented the 
Eighteenth Amendment, was constitutional, but rather it addressed how Ohio’s system 
of prohibition enforcement violated due process.2 Ohio’s legislature had enacted a 
                                                          
 *  Assistant Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law. 
 1  Letter from William Howard Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Horace Taft, 
Brother of Taft (Mar. 7, 1927) (on file in the Library of Congress). 
 2  U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII reads: 
Section 1. After one year from the ratification of this article the manufacture, sale, or 
transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the 
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2017
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prohibition statute as an analog to the Volstead Act. 3 Known as the “Crabbe Act,” 
Ohio’s law barred the possession of “intoxicating liquor.”4 After mailing his letter to 
his brother, Taft walked to the Supreme Court and assembled the Justices to announce 
the decision. Reported in newspapers across the country, the decision, captioned as 
Tumey v. Ohio, 5 determined that Ohio’s downward delegation of prohibition 
enforcement to municipal courts failed to ensure due process.6 One day before writing 
to Horace, Taft wrote to his son Charles Phelps Taft II that the Court had unanimously 
determined that the Crabbe Act was “invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment” and 
then stressed that the Justices found the Ohio law repugnant to fundamental rights.7 
Tumey has become a benchmark for assessing judicial impartiality, but the legal 
history of the decision, including how it was shaped, has hardly been written about. 
Professor Robert Post, in an article titled “Federalism, Positive Law, and the 
Emergence of the American Administrative State:  Prohibition in the Taft Court Era,” 
                                                          
exportation thereof from the United States and all the territory subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited. 
 
Section 2. The Congress and the several States shall have concurrent power to enforce 
this article by appropriate legislation. 
 
Section 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an 
amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of the several States, as provided in 
the Constitution, within seven years from the date of the submission hereof to the States 
by the Congress. 
For more information on the implementation of the Eighteenth Amendment into law, see 
National Prohibition Act of 1919, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305. Although the National Prohibition Act, 
more commonly called the Volstead Act, implemented the Eighteenth Amendment, it further 
restricted prohibition by making possession of alcohol, with limited exceptions, unlawful. For 
more information on the constitutionality of the Volstead Act, see Rhode Island v. Palmer, 253 
U.S. 350 (1920). 
 3  An Act to Prohibit the Liquor Traffic and to Provide for the Administration and 
Enforcement of Such Prohibition and Repeal Certain Sections of the General Code, ch. 108, 
OHIO GEN. CODE 6212-15 (1919). This provision barred the possession of “any intoxicating 
liquors” within the state. Id. See, e.g., Ruppert v. Caffrey, 251 U.S. 264, 284 (1920). 
 4  See, e.g., Decker v. State, 150 N.E. 74, 75 (Ohio 1925); Krusoczky v. State, 140 N.E. 
614, 615 (Ohio 1923). It appears through the available case law that the majority of prohibition 
violations in Ohio were not, under state law, dealt with as felonies, but rather were adjudicated 
in municipal courts where it was common for fines to be assessed. However, a person’s failure 
to pay an adjudged fine could result in imprisonment. 
 5  Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927). 
 6  See, e.g., Ohio Liquor Courts Declared Illegal; Supreme Court Rules Costs as Judges’ 
Compensation Violates Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1927, at 3; Highest Court Sounds 
Doom of Liquor Courts in Ohio, THE CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Mar. 8, 1927, at 1, 10; Judge 
Cannot Profit by Own Decisions: Chief Justice Taft Gives Opinion in Case of Ohio Mayor, 
LEWISTON SUN (Maine), Mar. 8, 1927, at 1, 4; Ohio’s Dry Law Hit by Supreme Court, 
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Mar. 8, 1927, at 1. 
 7  Letter from William Howard Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court to Charles Phelps 
Taft II, son of William Howard Taft and Mayor, Cincinnati (Mar. 6, 1927) (on file in the Library 
of Congress). 
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placed Tumey as part of the Court’s authoritative—or “national”—expansion over the 
United States.8 Yet unlike decisions upholding Prohibition, Tumey placed restraints 
against its enforcement. Professor Post was not in error in analyzing Tumey in the 
context of Prohibition or the Court’s authoritative expansion, but to exclusively do so 
results in an incomplete historic analysis of the judicial intent underlying the decision. 
For instance, Tumey arose during Taft’s efforts to limit congressional attempts to 
govern the judiciary.9 The case was also decided at a time when Taft had been attacked 
as being beholden to corporate interests and therefore overly partial to wealthy 
litigants.10 Most importantly, Tumey was part of a line of cases and extrajudicial 
actions that Taft used to shape judicial ethics. A legal history centering on Taft’s 
conception of the duties and independence of judges, as well as constraints on judicial 
power, amplifies how he led a largely conservative, yet jurisprudentially diverse, 
Court to unanimously intervene in a state’s municipal court construct. While it may 
be correct, as legal historian Melvin Urofsky has pointed out, that during the period 
Taft sat as Chief Justice the justices limited their dissents in an effort to fend off 
Congressional efforts to narrow federal court jurisdiction, the justices did dissent in 
several appeals, particularly decisions involving criminal prosecutions.11 The 
unanimity underlying Tumey is also, in this light, a noteworthy element in analyzing 
Taft’s intent.   
Taft believed that Edward Tumey’s appeal from an Ohio conviction and sentence 
of a fine provided an avenue to force upon the states a base-line uniformity of judicial 
ethics that would bolster public confidence in the nation’s courts, including in its 
“inferior courts.”12 He also intended that this judicially crafted “base-line” would be 
                                                          
 8  Robert Post, Federalism, Positive Law, and the Emergence of the American 
Administrative State: Prohibition in the Taft Court Era, 48 YALE L. J. 1, 9 (2006). 
 9  See, e.g., Letter from James Beck, U.S. Representative, to William Howard Taft, Chief 
Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Jan. 2, 1928) (on file in the Seeley G. Mudd Library at Princeton 
University). In this letter, Beck responds to Taft that he will work with the Chief Justice to 
defeat a measure initiated by Senator George Norris to limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 
It is clear from this letter that Taft encouraged Beck, a former Solicitor General of the United 
States and Republican Congressman to work to defeat Norris: 
I have your kind letter of the 24th and you may be sure that, when the Norris Resolution 
comes up in the House, I will break my silence and have something to say about this 
attempt to destroy the Federal Courts. 
 
I do not know the present state of the resolution, but I rather imagine it has been 
smothered in the Judiciary Committee. However, I will find out what the situation is 
when Congress reconvenes today. 
Id. 
 10  Letter from George Norris, U.S. Senator, Neb., to Henrik Shipstead, U.S. Senator, 
Minn. (Dec. 7, 1922) (on file in the Library of Congress). 
 11  MELVIN UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: A LIFE 578-79 (2009). According to another 
commentator, Taft had three priorities as Chief Justice:  harmony, efficiency, and unanimity. 
“More than a clear docket, Taft wanted unanimous decisions.” THE SUPREME COURT IN 
CONFERENCE, 1940-1985:  THE PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS BEHIND NEARLY 300 SUPREME COURT 
DECISIONS, 73-74 (Del Dickson ed., 2001) [hereinafter THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE]. 
 12  THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra note 11, at 74-75. 
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expanded over time as new challenges arose. In examining Taft’s influence on the 
shaping of the judiciary, particularly during his tenure as chief justice, it becomes clear 
that Tumey should not be considered as simply a decision on the nexus between 
pecuniary interest and the public’s right to an independent and impartial judiciary. 
Rather, Tumey should be considered as a key part of an effort to create a judiciary 
limited on power, respectful of legislative processes, and also to ensure a system of 
impartial tribunals from local courts of limited jurisdiction to the nation’s highest 
court. Implicit in Taft’s efforts was a related, if not intertwined, goal of shaping the 
judiciary so that the public placed confidence in it. However, as noted further below, 
Tumey was also a “family affair” which arose in the very geographic area that Taft 
and his family had obtained political prominence, and this too influenced the 
decision.13  
The Court’s grant of certiorari to Tumey’s appeal was unique for several reasons.  
Notwithstanding the fact that during Taft’s tenure the Court overturned state 
convictions based on the teaching of children in the German language in World War 
I, and in one instance, it overturned a state trial court conviction based on a white-mob 
dominating a trial of African-American defendants, the Court had been historically 
reticent to apply the Fourteenth Amendment to state criminal trial procedures.14 As a 
sampling, in 1884 in Hurtado v. California,15 the Court determined that the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not mandate the Fifth Amendment’s grand jury requirement in state 
felony trials. In 1900, in Maxwell v. Dow,16 the Court not only reaffirmed that the 
Fourteenth Amendment did not require a grand jury for a state felony prosecution to 
proceed, but also decided that the Constitution did not require state felony trials to 
                                                          
 13  See infra Section I.B. 
 14  See, e.g., MARK WARREN BAILEY, GUARDIANS OF THE MORAL ORDER: THE LEGAL 
PHILOSOPHY OF THE SUPREME COURT, 1860-1910, at 106-12 (2004); THE WARREN COURT IN 
HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 18-19 (Mark Tushnet ed., 1993); HENRY J. ABRAHAM, 
THE JUDICIARY: THE SUPREME COURT IN THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS, 127-28 (Dorian M. Ring 
ed., 1991).  The “German language teaching” cases are Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), 
and Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923). 
  In Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 87, 92 (1923), the Court, in a decision authored 
by Justice Holmes, briefly discussed the facts asserted by counsel representing the five 
African American men who had been sentenced to death in two trials, but then 
determined that the Court would not take accept the facts underlying the trial, as part of 
its decision. Moore v. Dempsey, Rather, the Court sent the appeal back to the United 
States District Court to determine whether the state had taken “protective processes,” to 
ensure the accused men had been afforded due process in both trials. Thus, while the 
Court upheld the principle articulated in Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309, 345 (1915), 
that a mob-dominated trial lacked due process, the Court in Moore did not specifically 
find that the trial on appeal had violated due process. Because of the decision’s dearth 
of facts and analysis, Moore might only be tangentially part of Taft’s conception of 
judicial ethics. Certainly, the trial judge could have barred the white mob from 
collecting near the court-room, but such an action was not discussed in Taft’s 
correspondences nor that of the collections of the other justices. 
 15  Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 553 (1884). 
 16  Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 604-05 (1900). 
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have twelve jurors as a minimum.17 Eight years later in Twining v. New Jersey,18 the 
Court determined that the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition against compulsory self-
incrimination did not preclude a state trial judge from instructing a jury that a 
defendant’s decision to not testify in his own defense could be considered as evidence 
of guilt.19 This decision permitted juries in state criminal trials to consider a “negative 
inference” against a defendant that was unconstitutionally impermissible in federal 
criminal trials. Thus, if the Court were to overturn Tumey’s conviction, and by 
implication Ohio’s statutes and case law, the justices would, at a minimum, have to 
determine whether the Fourteenth Amendment required judicial impartiality in all of 
the nation’s inferior courts that were administered by the states, counties, and 
municipalities. Unlike the appeals arising from convictions for teaching elementary 
school pupils in the German language, which had no federal criminal analog, Tumey 
was convicted of violating a nationwide offense that had been emplaced into the 
Constitution, albeit his conviction was prosecuted as a state crime.20 
The Court and the lesser federal courts have consistently cited to Tumey since its 
issuance, but the judiciary’s use of the decision appears to have buried its legal history 
into a few non-descript phrases. For instance, in 2015 in Williams-Yulee v. Florida 
Bar,21 Tumey is cited twice but only as a baseline in finding that a rule prohibiting a 
judicial candidate from directly soliciting potential donors was not unconstitutional. 
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice John Roberts observed, “The concept of public 
confidence in judicial integrity does not easily reduce to precise definition, nor does it 
lend itself to proof by documentary record. But no one denies that it is genuine and 
compelling.”22 As noted throughout this Article, Taft linked public confidence to 
                                                          
 17  Id. Justice Rufus Peckham, who authored the majority opinion, penned into the decision: 
It appears to us that the questions whether a trial in criminal cases not capital shall be 
by a jury composed of eight instead of twelve jurors, and whether in case of an infamous 
crime a person shall only be liable to be tried after presentment or indictment of a twelve 
jurors, and whether in case of an determined by the citizens of each State for themselves, 
and do not come within the clause of the amendment under consideration, so long as all 
persons within the jurisdiction of the state are made liable to be proceeded against by 
the same kind of procedure and to have the same kind of trial, and the equal protection 
of the laws is secured to them. 
Id. at 604. The Court’s reasoning in Maxwell continued into the post-Warren Court era. For 
instance, in Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 411 (1972), and Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 
356, 363 (1972), the Court, in a decision authored by Justice Byron White, determined that the 
Fourteenth Amendment did not require unanimous juries in state criminal trials even though 
unanimous twelve member juries were required in federal criminal trials. 
 18  Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 114 (1908). In Adamson v. California, the Court 
essentially reaffirmed that while in a federal court it would be unconstitutional to permit a jury 
to consider a defendant’s silence or decision not to testify as evidence of guilt, the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not prohibit a state court from permitting a jury to consider such conduct. 
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 59 (1947). 
 19  Twining, 211 U.S. at 114. 
 20  Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 516 (1927). 
 21  Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S.Ct. 1656, 1659 (2015). 
 22  Id. at 1667. 
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judicial integrity in his approach to Tumey. In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Co.,23 the 
Court, in a decision authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, determined that an elected 
state supreme court judge was constitutionally required to recuse himself where an 
appellant had donated over $2 million to an organization which campaigned on behalf 
of the judge.  The majority cited to Tumey as “the early and leading case on the 
subject” of judicial recusal and noted that the Court in Tumey was concerned “with 
more than the traditional common-law prohibition on direct pecuniary interest.24 It 
also was concerned with a more general concept of interests that tempt adjudicators to 
disregard neutrality.”25 As noted below, while Taft would have agreed that Tumey 
prohibited a judge from having a direct pecuniary interest in case that he or she 
presided over, he certainly did not intend for the decision to serve as a ceiling on 
recusal.26 In Republican Party v. White,27 the Court, in a decision authored by Justice 
Antonin Scalia, determined that Minnesota’s statutory restriction against judicial 
candidates expressing their opinions on “disputed legal or political issues” prior to an 
election, failed under the First Amendment’s “strict scrutiny test.”28 In doing so, 
Justice Scalia and the majority implied that Tumey did not extend so far as restricting 
speech to the degree that Minnesota’s statute known as the “announce clause” 
prevented, even if the statute was intended to enforce the perception of judicial 
impartiality.29 It is unlikely that Taft would have agreed with the majority’s limitation 
of Tumey’s applicability because, as noted throughout this Article, at times, and within 
limits, he disapproved of judges overtly engaging in politics.30 Taft believed that 
judges who engaged in overt political activity would have to recuse themselves from 
trials and appeals where they had earlier publicly articulated a view on an issue.31 
Moreover, in the plain language of Tumey, it is clear that Taft intended for state 
legislatures to regulate their judicial branch to maximize public confidence in it. In 
short, the judicial intention underlying Tumey has been absent from the Court’s recent 
jurisprudence and should be given new life. 
With the recognition that the plain language of a decision is the paramount 
determination of what later decisions incorporate, a legal history of Tumey centering 
                                                          
 23  Caperton v. A.T. Massey Co., 556 U.S. 868, 889-90 (2009). 
 24  Id. at 876, 878. 
 25  Id. at 878. For reasons noted in Section V, in particular Ohio v. Dugan, 277 U.S. 61, 63 
(1928), the Court’s interpretation of Tumey in Caperton, without more, is understandable. 
 26  See infra Section III.B. 
 27  Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 768 (2002). Known as the “announce clause,” 
Minnesota’s law was designed to prohibit judicial candidates from promising outcomes in 
judicial decisions. 
 28  Id. at 772-73. The Court pointed out that the announce clause is a broader restriction than 
a prohibition against a judicial candidate promising to vote on a specific manner in a future 
litigation. 
 29  Id. at 776. 
 30  See infra Section I.A. 
 31  Id. 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol65/iss3/6
2017] LEGAL HISTORY OF TUMEY V. OHIO 323 
 
on judicial intent should result in a broader use of the decision regarding judicial 
disqualification.32 This Article is divided into four sections.   
Section I provides a short contextual overview of Prohibition as well as the “state” 
of judicial decorum and impartiality on the eve of Taft’s ascension to the Chief 
Justiceship and thereby provides context for Taft’s efforts. This section also includes 
a brief biography of Taft as well as the eight other justices serving on the Court at the 
time of Tumey. Section I also examines one decision, Berger v. United States,33 issued 
shortly before Taft’s nomination, for its impact on Tumey.  
Section II provides a brief overview of Taft’s legislative efforts as well as his role 
in the formation of the American Bar Association’s first ever issuance of a model set 
of judicial canons. This section also analyzes three significant Taft Court decisions on 
judicial authority, particularly in regards to the judiciary’s contempt power. The three 
decisions, Craig v. Hecht,34 Cooke v. United States,35 and Ex Parte Grossman,36 not 
only provide context to Taft’s theory of limited judicial authority, but also were part 
of a continuum leading to Tumey.   
Section III describes Tumey’s origins, including the backgrounds of the attorneys 
involved in the decision as well as the decision’s state legal history leading to the grant 
of certiorari. This section also analyzes how far Taft intended the decision to reach. 
That is, it provides evidence that Taft intended Tumey to influence more than 
challenges based on direct pecuniary interest.   
The conclusion, in Section IV, argues that while much of the past judicial use of 
Tumey is not in error—with the caveat that “overly narrow interpretation” and “not in 
error” are also not synonymous—there is a possible broader application for the 
decision than previously used in two areas. The first area involves challenges based 
on indirect pecuniary connections to a cause, and the second area encompasses 
challenges based on implied non-pecuniary interests in the outcome. Given that recent 
polling indicates a loss of public confidence in legal institutions, including the 
judiciary, (both the elected or appointed state judicial branches and the federal 
judiciary), a broader application of Tumey to disqualification would be consistent with 
Taft’s goal of maintaining judicial integrity in both its real form and in perception.37 
On this last point, there are two caveats:  (1) this Article does not call for the 
abolishment of judicial elections; and (2) in focusing on the application of Tumey to 
recusal/disqualification cases, the focus necessarily bypasses a detailed constitutional 
analysis of efforts to curb judicial pre-election campaign speech. 
                                                          
 32  See, e.g., United States v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482, 490 (1923); Maryland v. Baltimore 
Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 917 (1950). 
 33  Berger v. United States, 225 U.S. 22 (1921). 
 34  Craig v. Hecht, 263 U.S. 255 (1923). 
 35  Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925). 
 36  Ex Parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87 (1925). 
 37  As a poll sampling see, e.g., Jeffrey N. Jones, Trust in U.S. Judicial Branch Sinks to New 
Low of 53%, GALLUP POLL (Sept. 12, 2015); Billy Correher, Voters Overwhelmingly Support 
Judicial Election Reforms, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (June 21, 2013).   
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II. JUDICIAL AUTHORITY, IMPARTIALITY, AND DECORUM, ON THE EVE OF THE “TAFT 
COURT” 
Early in the nation’s history, Congress enacted a statute which prohibited federal 
judges from serving on cases in which the judge had a financial interest in the 
outcome.38 Toward the end of the Gilded Age, Congress began a process of 
implementing limited measures to govern the federal judiciary’s qualifications to 
serve on particular trials.39 For instance, in 1891, Congress prohibited appellate judges 
from serving on appeals in which they had earlier served as a trial judge.40 In 1911, 
Congress prohibited a judge from serving on a trial where the judge was also a 
witness.41 These laws were clearly limited to the narrow circumstances in which a 
federal judge was a property holder or shareholder, and the property or corporation 
was implicitly part of a trial in which the judge presided. Moreover, facially, the laws 
did not apply to the states, or, for that matter, the Supreme Court. 
The Eighteenth Amendment establishing Prohibition, and the Volstead Act 
implementing the Amendment in federal law, are historically intertwined with the U.S. 
entry into World War I.42 Likewise, both the War and Prohibition tested the federal 
judiciary’s authority as well as its impartiality. The timing of these events is important. 
On April 2, 1917, President Woodrow Wilson asked Congress to declare war on the 
Imperial German Government.43 Two days later, Senator Morris Sheppard, a Texas 
Democrat, introduced the Eighteenth Amendment’s text for consideration to the 
Senate.44 Two days after the introduction of the Amendment, Congress, in following 
Wilson’s request, declared war on the Imperial German Government.45 Six weeks 
later, Congress authorized a national conscription program under the Selective Draft 
Act and enacted a law titled as the Espionage Act.46 The Espionage Act prohibited 
                                                          
 38  Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 11, 1 Stat. 178–79. In 1821, Congress expanded this 
prohibition to include a judge’s near relatives, that is, the judge’s siblings, parents, or children, 
from having a financial interest in the outcome. See Act of Mar. 3, 1821, ch. 51, 3 Stat. 643. 
 39  Charles Gardner, Judicial Disqualification: An Analysis of Federal Law, FED. JUD. CTR., 
2010, at 5. 
 40  Evarts Act, ch. 23, § 3, 26 Stat. 826 (1891). 
 41  Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 20, 36 Stat. 1090. 
 42  See, e.g., G. EDWARD WHITE, LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY:  FROM RECONSTRUCTION 
THROUGH THE 1920S, at 296-97 (2016); Post, supra note 8, at 12; JUSTIN CROWE, BUILDING THE 
FEDERAL JUDICIARY: LAW COURTS AND THE POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 201 
(2012). 
 43  Jennifer K. Elsea & Matthew C. Weed, Declarations of War and Authorizations for the 
Use of Military Force: Historical Background and Legal Implications, CONG. RES. SERV., Apr. 
18, 2014, at 76. 
 44  RICHARD F. HAMM, SHAPING THE EIGHTEENTH AMENDMENT: TEMPERANCE REFORM, 
LEGAL CULTURE, AND THE POLITY, 1880-1920, at 240 (1995). 
 45  JAMES D. RICHARDSON, A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE 
PRESIDENTS, VOL. XVIII, at 8062-65 (1908); Act of Apr. 6, 1917, ch.1, 40 Stat.1. (declaring war 
on Germany); RICHARDSON, MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra. On December 
7, 1917 Congress declared war on Germany’s ally, the Austro-Hungarian Empire. See Act of 
Dec. 7, 1917, ch. 1, 40 Stat. 429 (declaring war on Austria-Hungary). 
 46  Act of Jun. 15, 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217.  
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persons from interfering with the raising, training, and deployment of the nation’s 
armed forces.47 At the same time, Congress authorized the Secretary of War to issue 
prohibitions to civilians on the sale of alcohol or prostitution near military bases, and 
violations of these regulations were punishable as crimes in federal court.48 Because 
of the Secretary of War’s statutory authority to delegate rule making to military 
officers, the authorization was a remarkable grant of power from Congress to permit 
the Army to establish civil, rather than military, crimes and punishments without 
further legislation.49 In early 1918, Congress expanded the Espionage Act with the 
passage of the Sedition Act.50 Congress also investigated ties between American 
breweries and distilleries and Germany.51 By 1919, over 500 people were convicted in 
the federal courts for violating the Espionage Act.52 Whether the majority of 
congressmen or federal judges realized it at the time, during the crisis of war and its 
aftermath during the so-called “Red Scare,” the ability to preserve impartiality in the 
nation’s courts would prove difficult.53 However, one prosecution in particular was to 
have a bearing on Taft’s efforts to reshape the nation’s judiciary. 
                                                          
 47  See, e.g., United States v. Pierce, 245 F. 878, 880 (N.D.N.Y. 1917). Section 3 of the 
Espionage Act read: 
Whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully make or convey false reports 
or false statements with intent to interfere with the operation or success of the military 
or naval forces of the United States or to promote the success of its enemies and 
whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully cause or attempt to cause 
insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces of 
the United States, or shall willfully obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service of the 
United States, to the injury of the service or of the United States, shall be punished by 
a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or 
both. 
 48  See Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15, § 13, 40 Stat. 76. This law was upheld in McKinley v. 
United States, 249 U.S. 397, 399 (1919). 
 49  See, e.g., Erwin Griswold, Government in Ignorance of the Law: A Plea for Better 
Publication of Executive Legislation, 48 HARV. L. REV. 198, 202 (1934). Griswold later served 
as Dean of Harvard University’s law school and then Solicitor General of the United States 
during the administrations of Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon. See LISA PRUITT, ERWIN 
GRISWOLD, GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 302-03 (John R. Vile ed. 2001). 
 50  Act of May 16, 1918, ch. 75, § 1, 40 Stat. 553 (1918). 
 51  Brewing and Liquor Interests and German Propaganda and Bolshevik Propaganda, 
Hearing Before Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 65th Cong. (1919). Known as the “Overman 
Committee,” after its chairman Senator Lee Slater Overman, a North Carolina Democrat, the 
investigation expanded into investigating the existence and impact of “Bolshevik” organizations 
in the United States. See JOHN THOMPSON, RUSSIA, BOLSHEVISM, AND THE VERSAILLES PEACE 
239 (1967). 
 52  RONALD K.L. COLLINS & SAM CHALTAIN, WE MUST NOT BE AFRAID TO BE FREE: STORIES 
OF FREE EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 24, (2011). 
 53  See, e.g., DAVID RAY PAPKE, HERETICS IN THE TEMPLE:  AMERICANS WHO REJECT THE 
NATIONS LEGAL FAITH 22 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 1998). One example of a 
federal judge involved in an extrajudicial governmental activity is Judge Julian Mack. In 1917, 
Judge Mack was appointed to a three-member board that oversaw conscientious objector claims. 
However, he also sat on several trials of citizens who refused to be inducted into the Army or 
Navy. See, e.g., JOSHUA E. KASTENBERG & ERIC MERRIAM, IN A TIME OF TOTAL WAR: THE 
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A. Berger v. United States 
Victor Luitpold Berger, a former Congressman of Austrian birth, was among the 
many citizens prosecuted under Espionage Act.54 He was also a member of the 
Socialist Party of America and the owner and editor of the Milwaukee Leader, a 
socialist oriented newspaper.55 At the time of Berger’s indictment and trial, he was in 
the process of running for an open senate seat in Wisconsin.56 In 1918, he and four 
codefendants delivered an affidavit to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District 
of Illinois to have federal judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis recuse himself.57 Berger 
and his codefendants alleged that Landis was biased against them on the basis that 
they were of German and Austrian birth and that Landis had, in other trials of persons 
charged under the Espionage Act or with evading conscription, openly denigrated 
Germans and pacifists.58 Landis’ son was also a pilot in the nascent Army Air Service 
and actively engaged in the war against Germany.59 The governing judicial code, as 
enacted by Congress in 1912, required Landis to recuse himself from the trial on 
receipt of Berger’s affidavit.60 Landis refused to do so, and Berger and his 
                                                          
FEDERAL JUDICIARY AND THE NATIONAL DEFENSE, 1940-1954, at 12 (2016); SECOND REPORT OF 
THE PROVOST MARSHAL TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR ON THE OPERATION OF THE SELECTIVE 
SERVICE SYSTEM TO DECEMBER 20, 1918, at 60 (1919). Interestingly, in 1917, Judge Mack kept 
Taft informed of his role in advising Congress on drafting a federal insurance program for 
soldiers and Taft supported Mack’s role in advising Congress on this program. See Letter from 
Julian Mack, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, to William Howard Taft, 
Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Aug. 25, 1917); and Letter from Taft, to Mack (Aug. 22, 
1917) (on file in the Library of Congress). 
 54  WILLIAM H. THOMAS, UNSAFE FOR DEMOCRACY:  WORLD WAR I AND THE U.S. JUSTICE 
DEPARTMENT’S COVERT CAMPAIGN TO SUPPRESS DISSENT 113 (Paul S. Boyer ed., 2008). 
 55  For more information on Berger, see id. 
 56  Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1921). 
 57  Id. at 27. 
 58  Id. 
 59  DAVID PIETRUSZA, JUDGE AND THE JURY:  THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JUDGE KENESAW 
MOUNTAIN LANDIS 110 (1988). Like Judge Landis, the recently deceased Justice Antonin 
Scalia’s son was in the Army and served in Afghanistan. In a speech at the University of 
Freiburg in Switzerland, presaging his dissent against the Court’s ruling in Boumediene v. Bush, 
553 U.S. 723 (2008), he stated in response to a question: 
Give me a break . . .  Hamdan . . . is arguing that the federal courts should have 
jurisdiction over his case, . . . if he was captured by my army on a battlefield, that is 
where he belongs. I had a son on that battlefield, and they were shooting at my son, and 
I'm not about to give this man who was captured in a war a full jury trial. I mean, it's 
crazy. 
Judge ‘Rejects Guantanamo Rights’: A US Supreme Court Justice Has Been Quoted as Saying 
That Guantanamo Detainees Do Not Have the Right to be Tried in Civil Courts, BBC NEWS 
(Mar. 27, 2006); see also Johnathan Turley, Our Loquacious Justices, LOS ANGELES TIMES, 
Mar. 28, 2006. For reasons that should be apparent in the text, neither Taft nor Holmes would 
have likely approved of Scalia’s speech. 
 60  See, e.g., Henry v. Speer, 201 F. 869 (5th Cir. 1913); see also Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 
231, 36 Stat. 1087. 
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codefendants were found guilty and sentenced to long terms in prison.61 In Berger v. 
United States, a decision authored by Justice Joseph McKenna, the Court determined 
that Landis’ failure to recuse himself in compliance with the governing statute required 
overturning the appellants’ convictions.62 Justices William Rufus Day, James Clark 
McReynolds, and Mahlon Pitney dissented.63  
The majority opinion is antiseptic in that it merely addresses the requirements of 
the judicial code, rather than the full range of Landis’ conduct or a constitutional right 
to an impartial judge. Indeed, Justice Holmes noted to his frequent correspondent 
Harold Laski that “the opinion was not all [he] could wish for,” and Holmes then went 
on to note that Day’s dissent was “feeble” and McReynolds’ dissent “improper in its 
rhetoric.”64 Holmes concluded his letter by observing, “Landis always seems to make 
himself conspicuous in ways that I lament.”65 Holmes’ observation on Landis is 
noteworthy for another reason. Berger’s trial and Landis’ wartime judicial conduct 
were widely reported in the nation’s newspapers.66 The New York Tribune reported 
that Landis had responded to Berger’s affidavit by calling it “a slander.”67 In 1920, 
Landis proclaimed to a meeting of business executives in Chicago, “It was my great 
disappointment to give Berger only 20 years in Leavenworth. I believe the law should 
have enabled me to have him lined up against the wall and shot.”68 
Landis became a well-known figure in 1919 after his appointment as 
Commissioner of Major League Baseball.69 Several scholars have characterized 
Landis’ dual service as baseball commissioner and federal judge as a conflict of 
interest which became the impetus for the American Bar Association’s 1924 Judicial 
Code.70 Taft was instrumental in creating this “first ever” judicial code, and he had 
                                                          
 61  Berger, 255 U.S. at 27, 36. 
 62  Id. 
 63  Id. 
 64  Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Harold 
J. Laski, Political Theorist (January 3, 1921) (on file in the Library of Congress). 
 65  Id. 
 66  As a sampling of other newspapers see Berger Conviction Reversed By Court, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 1, 1921, at 1; Judge Landis Overrules Dismissal Plea – Defendant’s Kin a Deserter, 
N.Y. SUN, Dec. 19, 1918; Judge Landis Puts a Stop to Delays of Socialist Defendants, 
WASHINGTON HERALD, Dec. 11, 1918, at 1. 
 67  Socialists’ Trial Set: Judge Landis Denies Berger a Change of Venue, N.Y. TRIBUNE, 
Nov. 17, 1918. 
 68  PIETRUSZA, supra note 59, at 149; Landis Regrets He Could Not Sentence Berger to be 
Shot, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1919 at 1. 
 69  See, e.g., NATHANIEL GROW, BASEBALL ON TRIAL: THE ORIGIN OF BASEBALL’S 
ANTITRUST EXEMPTION 68 (2014); Shayna M. Sigman, The Jurisprudence of Judge Kenesaw 
Mountain Landis, 15 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 277, 277-78 (2007). In the 1988 movie Eight Men 
Out, actor John Anderson played the role of Landis. 
 70  See, e.g., GEOFFREY C HAZZARD ET AL., LAW OF LAWYERING 695 (Vol. 2, 2015); RONALD 
R. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, 327 (2008); Molly McDonough, Bench Battles 
Become Vocal: ABA Reviews Judges’ Code as Judicial Speech, Once Muzzled, Finds its Voice 
Again, 19 A.B.A.J., 18-20 (2003); FRANK L. DEWEY, THOMAS JEFFERSON LAWYER 81 (1986); 
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little regard for Landis.71 But Taft’s dislike of Landis was much deeper than Landis’ 
conflict of interest as baseball commissioner, and the model judicial code came about 
for several reasons. In 1910, while serving as President, Taft told the Detroit Times 
that Landis was “an obscure demagogue of a judge.”72 What Taft did not say to the 
Detroit newspaper was also important. Landis had a personal relationship with Taft 
through Taft’s older brother, Charles Phelps Taft, who simultaneously owned two 
major league baseball teams, the Philadelphia Phillies and Chicago Cubs, and Landis 
opposed a person owning two teams.73 Moreover, in 1912, Taft, while in his last year 
as President, removed Landis’ older brother from a postmaster position after accusing 
him of neglect of duties.74 In 1921, the House of Representatives Judiciary Committee 
investigated Landis’ conduct with the possibility of drafting articles of impeachment 
against him.75 Congressman Benjamin Welty, an Ohio Democrat, accused Landis of 
violating ethics norms for serving as commissioner of baseball and his federal 
judgeship at the same time.76 However, Landis departed the bench by the time the 
House could complete its report.77 
 B. Judicial Biography 
It has been observed that Taft had an affinity for the Judicial Branch over the 
Executive Branch and an overarching desire to become Chief Justice.78 He also had an 
interest in reforming the judiciary by stemming progressive influences on it because 
he believed that “progressive” changes to the law should only originate in the elected 
branches of government.79 His distrust of progressive judges stemmed from the belief 
                                                          
Robert B. McKay, The Judiciary and Nonjudicial Activities, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 14 
(1970); AM. BAR ASS'N, LANDIS RESOLUTION, 46 REP. OF THE A.B.A. 61-67 (1921). 
 71  CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, 2011 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, 1-2 (Dec. 
31, 2011). See, e.g., Conduct of Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis, Hearings Before H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 65th Cong. 4-6 (1921). 
 72  PIETRUSZA, supra note 59, at 97. 
 73  Id. at 73. 
 74  Taft Removes Landis, San Juan Postmaster Who Aided Roosevelt Accused of Neglect, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1912, at 6. 
 75  Conduct of Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis, supra note 71. 
 76  Id. at 5.  
 77  Landis Quits to Aid Legion and Baseball: Too Much Work His Excuse to Public, 
CHICAGO SUNDAY TRIBUNE, Feb. 19, 1922, at 1. 
 78  PETER G. RENSTROM, THE TAFT COURT: JUSTICES, RULINGS, AND LEGACY 72-73 (2003); 
JOHN ANTHONY MALTESE, THE SELLING OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES 47-48 (1998). 
 79  RENSTROM, supra note 78, at 72-73; see also Donald F. Anderson, Building National 
Consensus: The Career of William Howard Taft, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 323, 340-41 (2000); William 
Howard Taft, The Attacks on the Court and Legal Procedure, 5 KY. L.J. 1, 8 (1916). Taft noted: 
The third criticism of this class against judges and courts is that in the application of the 
common law to new conditions, judges are out of touch with social progress and reform. 
They are, it is said, rigid and reactionary and fail to shape their so-called judge-made 
law to hasten the steps of society to the better things that social reformers plan. Indeed, 
this is said to be true of our courts not only in the application of the common law, but 
also in their construction of constitutions and the interpretation of statutes. The proper 
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that such judges created law.80 Taft was born in 1857 in Cincinnati to a political family 
whose roots stretched to the nation’s founding.81 His father, Alfonso Taft, had served 
as both Secretary of War and Attorney General during Ulysses Grant’s presidency and 
later as both U.S. Minister to Austria-Hungary and Russia during Chester Arthur’s 
presidency.82 Taft was educated at Yale University as well as the Cincinnati Law 
School, the predecessor of the University of Cincinnati’s law school.83 He then, in 
order, served as:  assistant prosecutor of Hamilton County, Ohio, Ohio’s internal 
revenue collector, Hamilton County solicitor, superior court judge of Hamilton 
County, Solicitor General of the United States, law school professor and dean of the 
Cincinnati Law School, judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit, Governor of the Philippine Islands, and Secretary of War.84 He was elected 
President of the United States in 1908, but in 1912, he lost to Woodrow Wilson in a 
four-way race against Wilson, Theodore Roosevelt, and Eugene Debs.85 In contrast to 
Debs, who ran as a socialist; Roosevelt, who ran as a liberal progressive; and Wilson, 
who also ran as a progressive reformer, Taft was the most conservative of the 
candidates even though he too embraced aspects of progressivism.86 From 1913 until 
1921, when President Warren G. Harding nominated Taft as Chief Justice, Taft taught 
at Yale, remained active in the law, and generally supported Wilson’s efforts to have 
the country join the League of Nations.87 
Among the myriad features involving Taft’s efforts at judicial reform, three aspects 
of his judicial conduct must be taken into consideration when assessing Tumey. The 
first is that by the time of Tumey’s appeal, Taft had been accused of being beholden 
                                                          
discharge of the difficult duties of courts requires as judges men of great ability, wide 
experience, profound learning, independence and force of character, of nice 
discriminating judicial quality, and with the statesmanlike perception of the distinction 
between those fundamental principles of law that must be constantly maintained and 
preserved in any useful system of government and of the casual and temporary rules of 
human conduct that may be changed from time to time as conditions change, in the 
promotion of social justice and the pursuit of community happiness. 
Id. at 8. 
 80  See, e.g., EDWARD A. PURCELL, BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, 
THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY 
AMERICA 21-22 (2000); EDGAR J. MCMANUS & TARA HELFMAN, LIBERTY AND UNION:  A 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 254 (concise ed. 2014); DAVID HENRY 
BURTON, TAFT, HOLMES, AND THE 1920S COURT: AN APPRAISAL 42 (1988); Stanley I. Kutler, 
Chief Justice Taft and the Delusion of Judicial Exactness: A Study in Jurisprudence, 48 VA. L. 
REV. 1407 (1962). 
 81  TIMOTHY L. HALL, SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: A BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY 275-78 
(2001). 
 82  Id.  
 83  Id.; see also RENSTROM, supra note 78, at 72-73. 
 84  RENSTROM, supra note 78, at 72-73. 
 85  Id. 
 86  Id. 
 87  Anderson, supra note 79, at 344-45. 
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to corporate interests.88 In 1923, the Court invalidated a federal minimum wage as it 
applied to women in the District of Columbia in Adkins v. Childrens’ Hospital.89 
Adkins narrowed the reach of prior decisions that upheld state legislative restrictions 
on wages and working conditions. For instance, in 1908, the Court upheld state laws 
on the number of hours that women could be employed in certain occupations as a 
matter of the state exercising its police power to ensure the health of women.90 Nine 
years later, the Court upheld Oregon’s law capping a workday for both women and 
men at ten hours.91 Taft dissented in Adkins and noted that although reducing the 
number of hours an employee worked might not be wise in solving the “evils of the 
sweating system,” a state legislature, or, in this instance, Congress, should at least 
possess the lawful authority to do so.92  
Following the Court’s issuance of Adkins, newspaper magnate William Randolph 
Hearst attacked Taft as being “a sop” to “bankers and corporations,” even though Taft 
had dissented from the majority.93 Hearst may have believed that Taft’s dissenting 
opinion was tepid in its criticism of the majority’s opinion. The attack was based on 
Taft’s relationship to Andrew Carnegie, one of the world’s wealthiest citizens who 
had amassed a fortune in iron and steel production.94 In 1919, Carnegie designated 
millions of dollars to an endowment for the purpose of promoting world peace, and an 
independent agency, which Taft officered, paid Taft’s salary through the 
endowment.95 However, Taft did not learn of the endowment until 1919, and because 
the annuity that was granted as part of the endowment was not tied to United States 
Steel—the successor of Carnegie’s various corporations—he did not believe that there 
was any conflict of interest.96 Taft also decided, following Hearst’s attack on him, that 
the annuity had to be transferred to Yale University but that he could not resign from 
                                                          
 88  See RENSTROM, supra note 78, at 190-92. 
 89  Adkins v. Children’s Hosp. of D.C., 261 U.S. 525, 562 (1923). 
 90  Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 416-17 (1908). 
 91  Bunting v. Oregon, 234 U.S. 426, 434, 438 (1917). 
 92  Adkins, 261 U.S. at 562 (Taft, C.J., dissenting). Taft’s language in his dissent is helpful 
for placing criticisms against him in context. He wrote: 
Now, I agree that it is a disputable question in the field of political economy how far a 
statutory requirement of maximum hours or minimum wages may be a useful remedy 
for these evils, and whether it may not make the case of the oppressed employee worse 
than it was before. But it is not the function of this Court to hold congressional acts 
invalid simply because they are passed to carry out economic views which the Court 
believes to be unwise or unsound. 
Id. However, he went on to note that he did not concur with Holmes’ more forceful dissent in 
which Holmes scoffed at the majority’s use of “liberty of contract.” Id. at 563. 
 93  WILLIAM G. ROSS, A MUTED FURY: POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES, AND LABOR UNIONS 
CONFRONT THE COURTS, 1890-1937, at 234 (1994). 
 94  Id. 
 95  Id. (citing Letter from William H. Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Thomas 
W. Shelton, Executive Boardmember, California State Bar Ass’n (June 23, 1923)). 
 96  ROSS, supra note 93, at 234-35. 
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the Court because to do so would be a tacit admission of wrongdoing when no 
wrongdoing had occurred.97 Taft wrote to his oldest son Robert that: 
Hearst, who is attacking the Court generally, and is now attacking it 
because I accepted the bequest of an annuity from Carnegie in his will. It 
has given me a great deal of concern. I accepted it before I was on the 
bench, and I am quite sure I would not have accepted it had I been on the 
bench. I would be quite willing now to give it up or to assign it for some 
good purpose, but I don’t like to do it under fire, so that I suppose I shall 
have to stand the battering, which is quite nerve straining when one in 
engaged in work that should command all his attention.98  
Taft was not only offended with Hearst’s accusation; he also blamed Senators Robert 
La Follette and George Norris for the negative publicity and calls for Taft’s 
resignation.99 There is an irony to Hearst’s attack on Taft. In 1916, Taft wrote an article 
in the University of Kentucky Law Review about the state of the judiciary across the 
nation.100 In regard to the lesser state courts, he penned, “If a system could be devised 
that offered greater advantage to the wealthy litigant in resisting the claims of the poor 
litigant, I don't know what it is.”101 
A second aspect of Taft’s judicial tenure is that he remained politically active in 
consulting with his Republican peers on the best means to preserve the presidency in 
conservative Republican hands.102 For instance, in April 1928, he informed his son 
Robert that he had advised the Republican Party’s directors of the best means to have 
Herbert Hoover nominated.103 In 1923, President Coolidge had Taft work on part of 
his State of the Union Address.104 None of Taft’s political actions are surprising in 
light of the fact that he was a former President, and when also considering his efforts 
to achieve internal judicial reform with minimal congressional oversight, he may have 
found nothing unethical or untoward in coupling his lobbying on judicial 
administration efforts with political advice. As noted below, by the time of Tumey, 
Taft had also regularly corresponded with senior officers of the nation’s most 
politically powerful pro-Prohibition organization, the Anti-Saloon League.105 By 
                                                          
 97  Id. at 235. 
 98  Letter from William H. Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Robert Taft, son of 
William H. Taft (Apr. 16, 1923). 
 99  Letter from William H. Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Frank H. Hiscock, 
Chief Judge, New York Court of Appeals (Apr. 12, 1922). 
 100  See Taft, supra note 79. 
 101  Id. at 21. 
 102  See, e.g., William H. Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Robert Taft, son of 
William H. Taft (Apr. 27, 1924). In this letter, Taft informs his son Robert that at a gathering of 
Republicans he explained, “The only hope of the Republican Party is Coolidge and I thought 
Coolidge’s best course was to veto every bill that he seriously questioned.” Id. 
 103  Letter from William H. Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Robert Taft, son of 
William H. Taft (Apr. 15, 1928). 
 104  See, e.g., CROWE, supra note 42, at 206. 
 105  See infra notes 391, 393, 396, and accompanying text. 
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1908, the Anti-Saloon League had established offices in forty-three states, and the 
organization had allied not only with Protestant revival movements, but also with 
women’s suffrage organizations.106 
Finally, Taft’s view of Prohibition and the public’s perception of his support, or 
lack of support, for enforcement of the Volstead Act must be considered. Taft became 
Chief Justice shortly after the Eighteenth Amendment and the Volstead Act became 
fixtures in American society, and he had never publicly supported the passage of either 
measure.107 As President, he vetoed the Webb-Kenyon Act, a law requiring the federal 
government to prevent the shipment of alcohol from a state without prohibition laws 
to a state that prohibited alcohol.108 Taft’s reasoning behind his veto was that the act 
was constitutionally dubious in that it placed too much authority over individual states 
to influence the federal government, but Congress overrode his veto.109 In 1917, the 
Court upheld the act’s constitutionality, and prohibitionists lampooned Taft as a drunk 
for his earlier veto, leaving the impression that he did not support efforts to outlaw 
liquor.110 In light of this “public impression,” Taft’s actions in Tumey are noteworthy 
given that the decision was clearly not pro-liquor enforcement. 
In a short time, doubts as to whether Taft supported the Eighteenth Amendment 
and the Volstead Act were overshadowed by the certainty of his passion for ensuring 
that the criminal laws were enforced. For instance, in Carroll v. United States, Taft 
led a majority of the Court to uphold the warrantless search of vehicles suspected of 
transporting alcohol in violation of the Volstead Act.111 Prior to the issuance of Carroll 
on March 2, 1925, Taft had written to Horace, “The automobile is the greatest 
instrument for promoting immunity of crimes of violence.”112  The automobile had, in 
fact, been instrumental to “bootleggers,” and although Justice McReynolds recognized 
this fact in the first sentence of his dissent, he took Taft and the majority to task for 
carving out a Fourth Amendment exception for the singular purpose of enforcing the 
Volstead Act.113 Likewise, in Olmstead v. United States114 Taft led the Court to uphold 
                                                          
 106  See J.C. Jackson, The Work of the Anti-Saloon League, 32 ANNUALS OF THE AM. ACAD. 
OF POL. AND SOC. SCI. 12 (1908). 
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 109  COOPER, supra note 108. 
 110  Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Md. Ry. Co., 242 U.S. 311, 320 (1917). 
 111  Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925).   
 112  Letter from William H. Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Horace D. Taft, 
brother of William H. Taft (Nov. 16, 1923). 
 113  Carroll, 267 U.S. at 163 (McReynolds, J., dissenting). Justice McReynolds, with Justice 
Sutherland joining, penned as the first sentence, “The damnable character of the ‘bootlegger's’ 
business should not close our eyes to the mischief which will surely follow any attempt to 
destroy it by unwarranted methods.” Id. 
 114  Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
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a conviction under the Volstead Act obtained through warrantless wiretap evidence.115 
Moreover, shortly after the Court issued Tumey, he complained to his son Charles 
Phelps Taft II, a county prosecutor, that Congress had failed to adequately fund the 
Treasury Department to hire enough prohibition agents.116 One month after his 
complaint against Congress, Taft encouraged Charles to prosecute bootleggers to his 
fullest ability in writing: 
I am sorry to hear of your crime wave in Cincinnati. The immunity of these 
bootleggers, due to the original conspiracy that prevents and terrorizes the 
natural witnesses of the crime, is something I presume they have had in 
other parts of the country. There is nothing to do but just keep at it and hire 
more detectives, if you need them, and after a while you will begin to get 
the thread and then you will have a collection of crimes and convictions 
that will break the thing up, but it needs hard work and close 
investigation.117   
In 1925, he tried to place into an annual Judicial Conference report that one of the 
reasons for the federal district court caseload congestion was because several states 
had yet to enact or adequately enforce “little Volstead statutes.”118 Ironically, Ohio’s 
liquor prosecution laws were partly designed to ease congestion in the state and federal 
courts. Finally, shortly after the Court issued Tumey, Taft wrote to the editor of the 
Cincinnati Times-Star: 
We could not avoid declaring the law in respect to such trials to be contrary 
to due process. It is one of those instances in which an enthusiastic Attorney 
General anxious to secure the proper enforcement of the prohibition law 
forgot the rights of individual defendants as secured by the Constitution.119 
Taft, of course, was merely the “first among equals,” and the other eight justices 
had differing jurisprudential philosophies. In 1927, the Court consisted of Justices 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Willis Van Devanter, James Clarke McReynolds, Louis 
Brandeis, George Sutherland, Pierce Butler, Edward T. Sanford, and Harlan Fisk 
Stone.120 With the exception of Holmes and Brandeis, and to a lesser degree Stone, the 
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brother of William H. Taft (July 9, 1927). 
 117  Letter from William H. Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Charles P. Taft, 
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Court was decidedly conservative and wary of the judicial extension of federal power 
over state authority.121  
Theodore Roosevelt nominated Holmes to the Court in 1902.122 Holmes had, by 
the time of his appointment, become one of the leading legal scholars in the English-
speaking world.123 Born in Boston in 1841 to a father who was a nationally known 
poet, Holmes served in Union Army in the Civil War, graduated from Harvard 
University’s law school in 1867, authored legal treatises, and was appointed to the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in 1882.124 By the time of Tumey, Holmes was 
considered a progressive justice and had dissented in several notable cases in which 
he believed the federal and state governments had unconstitutionally trammeled the 
free speech rights of citizens during and immediately after World War I.125 
Willis Van Devanter was born in 1859 in Indiana and, like Taft, attended the 
predecessor to the University of Cincinnati’s law school.126 At the age of thirty, he 
moved to the Wyoming Territory and became involved in Republican state politics.127 
In a short time, Senator Francis E. Warren became his benefactor.128 Warren was one 
of the “old guard” conservatives in Congress, and he successfully lobbied Roosevelt 
to appoint Van Devanter to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit.129 
In 1910, under pressure from Warren, Taft nominated Van Devanter to the Court, 
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1921, at 21-23 (1999). 
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where he became one of the more conservative justices.130 Van Devanter was noted 
for his inability to write opinions in a timely manner.131 
Two of Woodrow Wilson’s judicial appointees remained on the Court at the time 
of Tumey:  James Clarke McReynolds and Louis Dembitz Brandeis. The two justices 
were opposites in almost every conceivable manner.132 McReynolds was born in 1862 
in Kentucky and attended Vanderbilt University, where he graduated as valedictorian 
in 1882.133 He later attended the University of Virginia and then served as a secretary 
to Howell Edmunds Jackson, a United States senator and later Supreme Court 
justice.134 Wilson nominated McReynolds as Attorney General in 1913 and then to the 
Court in 1914.135 Although McReynolds vigorously prosecuted antitrust violations, he 
was not a progressive and became one of the more conservative justices, as well as the 
Court’s leading bigot in the twentieth century.136   
In contrast, Brandeis had been a long-time progressive, and after graduating from 
Harvard University’s law school, he fought to uphold limitations on working hours, a 
minimum wage, and workplace safety regulations.137 He also distrusted the power of 
large corporations over elected governments.138 Brandeis was born in 1856 in 
Kentucky to immigrant Jewish parents from the Habsburg Empire and graduated from 
high school at the age of fourteen and law school at the age of eighteen.139 His 
nomination to the Court in 1916 was one of the more contentious in American history, 
and much opposition to him stemmed from his Jewish faith.140 Indeed, Taft vigorously 
lobbied Republicans to oppose Brandeis.141 Like Holmes, Brandeis dissented from 
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decisions which encroached into free speech, and he continued to champion workplace 
safety and wages regulations.142 
In addition to Taft as Chief Justice, President Warren G. Harding appointed George 
Sutherland, Pierce Butler, and Edwin Sanford to the Court. Sutherland was born in 
England in 1862 and immigrated to Utah with his parents one year later.143 He was 
educated by his parents and worked in a clothing store and as an agent for Wells Fargo 
before entering the Brigham Young Academy to study law.144 In 1881, he began a 
formal course of legal study at the University of Michigan’s law school, and after 
passing that state’s bar examination one year later, he returned to Utah.145 In 1900, 
Utah’s voters sent him to the House of Representatives as a Republican, where he 
served a single term.146 In 1904, the Utah state legislature sent him to the Senate, where 
he served for two terms.147 Sutherland supported women’s suffrage, befriended Taft, 
and, after leaving the Senate, became the American Bar Association’s president.148 
Taft endorsed Sutherland’s position on the Court to President Harding.149 
Pierce Butler has not fared well in the legal academy. He has been called “the least 
gifted and in many ways the most doctrinaire of the [so-called] four horsemen.”150 
Taft, however, lobbied Harding to nominate Butler to the Court.151 Senator George 
Norris, Taft’s chief opponent in the Senate, vocally opposed Butler’s nomination to 
the Court because of his ties to “corporate interests.”152 Norris was not alone in his 
opposition. Liberals and progressives opposed Butler as well.153 Harding’s last 
                                                          
 142  Id. at 94. 
 143  Edward L. Carter & James C. Phillips, The Mormon Education of a Gentile Justice: 
George Sutherland and Brigham Young Academy, 33 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 332, 332 (2008). 
 144  Andrew Morse, The New Respect for Justice Sutherland, 25 UTAH BAR. J. 18, 19 (2012). 
 145  Id. at 18. 
 146  HADLEY ARKES, THE RETURN OF GEORGE SUTHERLAND: RESTORING A JURISPRUDENCE OF 
NATURAL RIGHTS 48 (1994). 
 147  Id. at 23. 
 148  Morse, supra note 144, at 20. 
 149  DOUGLAS CLOUATRE, PRESIDENTS AND THEIR JUSTICES 224 (2010). 
 150  HENRY JULIAN ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF THE 
SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH II 149 (5th ed. 2008). According 
to Abraham, Taft had lobbied Harding to appoint former Solicitor General John W. Davis, but 
Harding was unwilling to consider appointing a Democrat to the bench, even though Davis was 
a conservative from West Virginia. Id. Abraham also notes that Butler had a prejudice against 
Germans and socialists. Id. This would have placed Butler in the same category as Landis. 
 151  Id. There is an irony to Butler’s reputation. In 1964, David Danelski published the only 
full-length study of Butler. See generally DAVID DANELSKI, A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE IS 
APPOINTED (1964). In a review of the book, noted legal historian Loren Beth conceded that book 
had “admirable objectivity,” but was a “failure to make a serious attempt to place the 
appointment within its political, social, and historical framework . . . .”  Loren Beth, Book 
Review: A Supreme Court Justice is Appointed, 27 J. POL. 675-77 (1965). 
 152  Letter from George Norris, U.S. Senator, Neb., to Henrik Shipstead, U.S. Senator, 
Minn. (December 7, 1922) (on file in the Library of Congress). 
 153  ABRAHAM, supra note 136, at 143. 
20https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol65/iss3/6
2017] LEGAL HISTORY OF TUMEY V. OHIO 337 
 
appointment is, perhaps, more historically obscure than Butler. In 1923, Harding 
nominated Edward Terry Sanford to the Court, but he served for only seven years and 
is best remembered for authoring the majority opinion in Gitlow v. New York,154 a 
decision which upheld a New York conviction under New York’s criminal 
syndicalism statute was based on speech, and Whitney v. California,155 which upheld 
California’s anti-syndicalism that criminalized association with an organization whose 
alleged aim was to “overthrow” the government.156 
Harlan Fiske Stone was the most junior of the justices serving on the Court at the 
time of Tumey, having been appointed by President Coolidge in 1925.157 Stone had 
been Coolidge’s college friend at Amherst University and served as Coolidge’s 
Attorney General for a year prior to his judicial nomination.158 He was born in 1875, 
attended Columbia University’s law school, and later became its dean.159 He also 
worked in private practice and became a partner at Sullivan and Cromwell.160 Coolidge 
sought Stone’s help in rooting out corruption in the Justice Department.161 Over time, 
Stone generally aligned with Brandeis and Holmes on appeals from criminal 
convictions as well as regarding the extent of federal authority over individual 
citizens.162 
 C. Taft and the Shaping of Judicial Governance 
Taft was directly responsible for two statutory changes in the federal judiciary. In 
1922, Congress passed the Judicial Conference Act, which enabled a chief justice to 
assign district court judges outside of their districts on a temporary basis.163 This part 
of the law was related to Prohibition in the sense that the numbers of criminal trials 
dramatically increased in some federal judicial districts—particularly those near the 
Canadian border.164 The Anti-Saloon League’s leaders viewed this change with 
suspicion and accused Taft of seeking to place “wet judges” in areas with a large 
prohibition caseload.165 The law also created the Judicial Conference, an annual 
meeting between the senior circuit judges and the Chief Justice to craft legislative 
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proposals to Congress.166 In 1925, Taft convinced Congress to enable to the Court to 
gain a greater degree of control over its own docket. In what became known as the 
Judiciary Act of 1925, Congress reduced the obligatory jurisdiction of the Court and 
replaced it with “certiorari jurisdiction.”167 In both instances, Taft had to overcome 
opposition from not only Senators Norris and Robert LaFollette, but also Senator 
Thomas Walsh, a powerful member of the Judiciary Committee.168 
The Judiciary Act bears further mention than one sentence. From his time as a 
judge on the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Taft had concluded that appeals 
accepted by the nation’s highest court should only be constitutional in nature.169 In 
1910, in his second annual address to Congress, Taft stated, “No man ought to have, 
as a matter of right, a review of his case by the Supreme Court.”170 Four years later, 
while serving as a law professor at Yale, Taft began to lobby specific congressmen to 
draft a bill enabling the Court to reduce the numbers of appeals that the justices found 
lacked merit for review.171 The Court was, in fact, flooded by large numbers of what 
could be characterized as “garden variety” appeals that required the justices to review, 
thereby creating a large gap in time between the arrival of the appeal and the issuance 
of a determination.172 He led a judicial effort to achieve greater control over not only 
the Court’s docket, but also that of the lower federal courts, writing to Brandeis that 
the trials and appeals had become so voluminous that “justice became delayed into 
injustice.”173 He asked the justices to join a committee headed by the Chief Justice and 
including senior circuit justices to propose legislation to Congress.174 
Although Taft strove for judicial efficiency, any analysis of Taft’s drive to reform 
the federal and state judiciaries must take into account how the public perceived 
judges. The first three decades of the twentieth century witnessed an increase in 
impeachment trials against federal judges. In 1903, the Senate acquitted district court 
judge Charles H. Swayne after the House of Representatives had earlier determined 
that he was guilty of several improprieties, including abusing his contempt 
authority.175 Six years later, the House of Representatives conducted an investigation 
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into Lebbeus R. Wilfley, a federal judge presiding over a consular court in China, after 
a legislator accused him of anti-Catholic bias.176 In 1912, Congressman Victor Berger, 
who was later convicted under the Espionage Act, asked the House of Representatives 
to investigate Cornelius Hanford, a district court judge in Washington, and that same 
year, the House of Representatives issued articles of impeachment against Robert 
Wodrow Archbald, a judge on the U.S. Commerce Court.177 A majority of the Senate, 
but not the requisite two-thirds, voted to remove Archbald.178 The accusations against 
Archbald included “procuring financial favors from litigants who were successful in 
his court” as well as arbitrarily exercising his contempt power.179 In 1913, the House 
of Representative investigated Emory Speer, the district court judge for the Southern 
District of Georgia.180 Speer had not engaged in any unethical conduct, but he was 
irascible and publicly chastised litigants.181 Speer was a rarity in southern politics. 
Although he fought in the Confederate Army during the Civil War, when he was 
elected to Congress from Georgia in 1878, he aligned with the Republican Party as an 
“independent Democrat.”182 Republican President Chester Arthur nominated Speer as 
a federal judge, but Taft had a particular dislike of him.183 In 1918, Taft wrote to 
Senator Elihu Root, “Speer is a nuisance, a man of the most injudicial quality of mind, 
a man who is a constant irritation to the Bar, and a man who uses his judicial power 
to gratify his personal likes and dislikes.”184    
Congressional investigations occurred well past Speer. Between 1914 and 1927, 
the House of Representatives investigated, in addition to Kennesaw Landis, Daniel 
Thew Wright on the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia,185 Alston Dayton on 
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the Northern District of West Virginia,186 William E. Baker on the Northern District 
of West Virginia,187 George English in the Eastern District of Illinois, and Frank 
Cooper on the Northern District of New York.188 Thus, by the time of Tumey, public 
confidence in the federal judiciary had been encumbered by number of well-publicized 
scandals.189 
In light of these investigations, it is unsurprising that late nineteenth- and early 
twentieth-century politics included angry attacks on the fairness of the nation’s courts. 
Senator George Norris of Nebraska articulated the beliefs of many Americans in 1912 
when he argued that the United States possessed two systems of courts, “one for the 
wealthy and one for the poor.”190 That year, Norris led the House of Representatives 
in the prosecution of Archbald.191 Norris’ criticism of the federal judiciary angered 
Taft, and throughout his presidency and judicial tenure, Taft expressed his dislike of 
Norris, but he understood that there existed a potential for due process weaknesses in 
the nation’s courts at all levels. For instance, in 1914, Taft warned the American Bar 
Association:  
The agitation with reference to the courts, the general attacks upon them, 
the grotesque remedies proposed by the recall of judges and recall of 
judicial decisions, and the resort of demagogues to the unpopularity of the 
courts as a means for promoting their own political fortunes, all impose on 
us as members of the bar and upon judges of the courts and legislatures, the 
duty to remove . . . grounds for just criticism of our judicial system.192 
One means by which Taft sought to counter criticism in the judiciary was to create 
a uniform code of ethics for judges. A code of ethics, in hindsight, was overdue. In 
1908, the American Bar Association published its first canons of professional ethics 
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for all attorneys.193 It took sixteen years for the Association to issue its Cannons of 
Judicial Ethics after a two-year process in which Taft served as the chairman of the 
committee authoring the cannons.194 Taft recognized that the states would not be 
bound by a national ethics code, but in the hopes of national acceptance, he appointed 
Robert von Moschzisker, a justice on Pennsylvania’s supreme court, and Leslie 
Cornish, the chief justice of Maine’s supreme court, to the committee.195 The thirty-
six individual cannons that the bar association issued were a non-binding guidepost to 
govern the conduct of federal and state judges, but there are clear indicators for Taft’s 
expectations of judicial impartiality which exceeded the narrow issues before the 
Court in Tumey. 
Although Taft wanted to promote judicial integrity and public confidence in the 
judiciary, he did not abandon the idea of a jurisprudential test for judicial 
appointments. In 1922, Taft wrote to Elihu Root that he intended to meet with 
President Harding to convince him to appoint Henry Stimson to the Supreme Court.196 
Taft went on to claim that Woodrow Wilson had appointed Brandeis and Clarke to 
“reduce the importance of the Constitution and advance a progressive agenda.” He 
also urged, however, that “reactionary men” like McReynolds were an equal danger 
to individual rights and concluded, “We need men who are liberal but who believe that 
the corner stone of our civilization is in the proper maintenance of the guarantees of 
the Fourteenth Amendment and Fifth Amendment.”197 In 1926, Taft wrote to his 
brother Horace, “The truth is that McReynolds is quite unprincipled in his method of 
stating cases. He does not state them truthfully.”198 
III. THE “TAFT COURT” AND THE JUDICIAL CONTEMPT AUTHORITY 
The judicial authority to find a person guilty of contempt, including the power to 
sentence an offender to a fine and imprisonment, is not expressly stated in the 
Constitution’s text. Moreover, the judiciary’s contempt authority enables some of the 
very ends that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments prohibit the Executive Branch from 
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accomplishing—namely, the loss of liberty or property without a trial by jury.199 The 
judicial power to adjudge a witness, juror, spectator, or attorney of contempt is 
significant, among myriad reasons, because certain contempt convictions are 
tantamount to a finding of criminal guilt.200 A judicial finding of criminal contempt, 
coupled with a punitive sentence, is designed to “preserve the power and vindicate the 
authority of the courts.”201 A civil contempt, in opposite, is designed to protect the 
legal rights of litigants.202 There are safeguards, including the right of appellate review, 
to protect individuals from being adjudged guilty of either type of contempt.203 
Additionally, in criminal contempt hearings, a person is presumed to be innocent, and 
guilt must be established beyond a reasonable doubt.204 As an aside, civil contempt 
hearings were historically structured similar to criminal contempt hearings but appear 
to have caused less concern to the Court, as there were few, if any, grants of appellate 
review against a civil contempt finding up through Taft’s tenure. Given the Court’s 
grant of review to these appeals from contempt findings, it is clear that Taft was 
concerned with the contempt powers of judges, and he was not satisfied with how the 
Court and Congress had historically shaped this power. A brief history of the Court 
and contempt decisions is important to provide context to Taft’s efforts to curb the 
contempt authority. 
In 1789, Congress conferred to the Judicial Branch the authority to find persons in 
contempt, including the power to sentence a person to a fine or imprisonment.205 
Although the Constitution guarantees the right to trial by jury in criminal matters, from 
the beginning of the nation, this right was not thought to extend to contempt 
proceedings.206 In 1821, in Anderson v. Dunn, the Court determined that while the 
                                                          
 199  See, e.g., Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 302 (1888); Ex parte Cuddy, 131 U.S. 280, 283-
84 (1889).  
 200  Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911). Bucks Stove & Range, 
labor leader Samuel Gompers, and the American Federation of Labor ignored a judicial 
injunction to cease publishing documents that encouraged readers to boycott a corporation. The 
Court, in a decision authored by Justice Lamar, determined that a civil contempt arises when 
the judge issues an order for a party to accomplish and act and the imprisonment which results 
from the failure or refusal to conform with the act, is to convince the party to conform or remain 
in prison. Id. at 442. Put another way, Lamar penned into the decision, “If imprisoned . . . he 
carries the keys of his prison in his own pocket. He can end the sentence and discharge himself 
at any moment by doing what he had previously refused to do.” Id. 
 201  Id. at 441. 
 202  Eilenbecker v. Dist. Court, 134 U.S. 31, 36 (1890). However, in 1914, Congress enacted 
the Clayton Act which permitted jury trials in certain contempt proceedings involving picketing 
and boycotting activities by unions. See, e.g., Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chi., St. Paul, 
& Omaha Railway Co., 266 U.S. 42, 62-63 (1928); Bessette v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 
328 (1904); In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 594 (1895).  
 203  Myers v. United States, 264 U.S. 95 (1924). 
 204  Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 444 (1911). 
 205  Establishment of the Judicial Courts of the United States, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789). 
 206  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (“The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, 
shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been 
committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places 
as the Congress may by Law have directed.”); U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal 
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Constitution does not specifically vest Congress with the authority to punish for 
contempt, the authority to do so was readily apparent by implication.207 Dunn arose 
from a challenge to the House of Representatives finding a citizen in contempt.208 
Important to the decision, however, was that the Court observed that, although the 
issue on appeal had to do with the Legislative Branch’s contempt power, the federal 
courts were statutorily vested with the authority to find persons in contempt.209 
Moreover, the justices maintained that even if the statute did not exist, the power 
would remain.210 One can speculate that the justices involved in architecting this 
decision placed language regarding judicial contempt power to remind the political 
branches of government that such power was inherent in an independent judiciary. 
From 1789 through John Quincy Adams’ presidency in 1825, it appeared that the 
federal judiciary’s contempt authority had few defined limits. In 1826, the House of 
Representatives undertook impeachment hearings against Judge James Peck, a U.S. 
District Court Judge from Missouri.211 Peck earlier had adjudged an attorney named 
Luke E. Lawless guilty of contempt after Lawless published a newspaper article 
critical of one of Peck’s decisions regarding an antiquated Spanish land-claim.212 Peck 
sentenced Lawless to one day in prison and an eighteen-month suspension from the 
practice of law.213 At the time of Lawless’ article, Peck had already issued a ruling, 
and neither party had undertaken an appeal.214 Lawless argued to Peck that because 
the district court no longer had jurisdiction over the contested land-claim issue, Peck 
no longer had jurisdiction to hold a person in contempt who criticized the decision.215 
It took until March 23, 1830 for the House of Representatives to recommend that the 
Senate find Peck guilty of “high crimes or misdemeanors.”216 The Senate ultimately 
                                                          
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury 
of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have 
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; 
to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”). 
 207  Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204, 225 (1821). 
 208  Id. at 224-25. 
 209  Id. at 227. 
 210  Id. 
 211  ARTHUR J. STANSBURY, REPORT ON THE TRIAL OF JUDGE JAMES H. PECK, JUDGE OF THE 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MISSOURI, BEFORE THE SENATE OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AN IMPEACHMENT PREFERRED BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AGAINST 
HIM FOR HIGH MISDEMEANORS IN OFFICE 7 (1833). 
 212  Id. at 7. 
 213  Id. 
 214  Id. at 1. 
 215  Id. at 2, 4. 
 216  Id. at 6. 
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acquitted Peck by a vote of twenty-one to twenty.217 On the other hand, Peck’s 
overreach in his authority resulted in the Judicial Act of 1831.218 
In response to Peck’s action, Congress limited the contempt authority of federal 
judges to punish misbehavior in “the presence of the federal courts or so near thereto 
as to obstruct the administration of justice.”219 The 1831 Act also enabled a judicial 
finding of contempt against a person who threatened or attempted to influence an 
officer of the court, juror, or witness.220 In 1873, the Court in Ex Parte Robison221 
upheld the 1831 Act as it applied to the circuit courts, but the decision left open the 
question as to whether Congress possessed the authority to constrain the Court’s 
contempt authority.222 Robinson arose from a U.S. District Court’s disbarment of an 
attorney during a contempt hearing.223 The federal judge had ordered a witness to be 
present for a grand jury, but the witness remained absent.224 J.S. Robinson, an attorney 
named in the decision, had permitted the witness to remain in his office to avoid the 
judicial summons.225 The federal judge found Robinson guilty of criminal contempt 
and disbarred him.226 After granting a writ of mandamus, the Court, in a decision 
authored by Justice Stephen A. Field, unanimously determined that although the 
federal courts had the authority to both punish for contempt and to disbar an attorney 
by “striking the petitioner’s name from the roll of attorneys,” disbarment proceedings 
required a greater quantum of due process than a summary contempt proceeding.227 
That is, a disbarment hearing required notice and the opportunity to mount a 
defense.228 Thus, unlike a contempt hearing which could be held immediately 
following the alleged contempt, a disbarment hearing could only occur after the 
attorney had been given a reasonable time to assemble a defense. In 1890, in 
Eilenbecker v. District Court of Plymouth County, the Court, in a decision authored 
by Justice Samuel Freeman Miller, determined that the Fourteenth Amendment did 
not require a jury trial for a criminal contempt proceeding that resulted in a finding of 
guilt and an imprisonment for three months.229 
                                                          
 217  Id. at 474. 
 218  Walter Nelles & Carol W. King, Contempt by Publication in the United States, 28 
COLUM. L. REV. 401, 426-30 (1928). 
 219  Proceedings in the Senate of the United States in the Matter of the Impeachment of 
Charles Swayne: Judge of the Dist. Court of the United States in and for the Northern Dist. of 
Florida, 58th Cong., 757 (1905). 
 220  Id. 
 221  Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. 505 (1873). 
 222  Id. at 510-11.   
 223  Id. at 511. 
 224  Id. at 506. 
 225  Id. at 507. 
 226  Id. at 508. 
 227  Id. at 512-13. 
 228  Id. 
 229  Eilenbecker v. Dist. Ct. of Plymouth Cty., 134 U.S. 31, 32, 38 (1890). 
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In 1888, the Court issued Ex Parte Terry,230 a decision which originated in a 
habeas writ. On September 3, 1888, a woman named Sarah Althea Terry engaged in 
disorderly conduct in the United States District Court for California.231 In response, 
the presiding judge ordered the marshal to restrain Ms. Terry, who in turn assaulted 
the marshal.232 Ms. Terry’s husband, an attorney named David Terry, also assaulted 
the marshal.233 The presiding judge then found David Terry guilty of contempt and 
sentenced him to six months confinement.234 Problematic to the issue was that Justice 
Stephen Field was the presiding judge, albeit acting in his capacity as a circuit judge 
rather than as a justice of the Court.235 In his circuit decision, Field noted that Terry 
had brought a knife into the courtroom in violation of the law as well.236 Also 
problematic to the decision was the fact that Terry had been the chief justice of the 
California Supreme Court prior to Field serving on that court, and the two men had 
been long-time antagonists.237 
Justice John Harlan authored the majority opinion in which he recognized the 
inherent authority of the federal circuit courts to punish contempts.238 Harlan next 
applied a jurisdictional test to determine whether the Court could issue the writ.239 
Essentially, Harlan framed the issue as to whether the circuit judge had the authority 
to order Terry’s imprisonment and not whether the term of six months was 
reasonable.240 Terry argued that the contempt order was made in his absence, that the 
court never provided him notice, and that he was not given the opportunity to defend 
himself.241 Field had issued the contempt order after Terry was arrested but before he 
was brought back into the courtroom.242 However, in this instance, the Court denied 
the habeas writ on the basis that in issuing the contempt determination and sentence, 
“the judicial eye witnessed the act, and the judicial mind comprehended all the 
circumstances of aggravation, provocation, or mitigation; and, the fact being thus 
                                                          
 230  In re Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888). 
 231  Id. at 298. 
 232  Id. 
 233  Id. 
 234  Id.. 
 235  In re Terry, 36 F. 419, 420 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1888). 
 236  Id. at 419. 
 237  David Schultz, Field, Stephen 1816-1899, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE UNITED STATES 207, 208 (David S. Tanenhaus ed., 2008). Ultimately Terry attempted to 
assassinate Field, but was killed by Field’s protecting United States Marshal before 
accomplishing the act. See In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 5 (1890). 
 238  In re Terry, 128 U.S. at 302. 
 239  Id. at 306. 
 240  Id. 
 241  Id. at 306. 
 242  Id. at 311. 
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judicially established, it only remained for the judicial arm to inflict proper 
punishment.”243 
In 1906, in United States v. Shipp,244 the Court, in a decision authored by Justice 
Holmes, unanimously held that it not only possessed the authority to determine the 
extent of its own jurisdiction, it also determined that it possessed jurisdiction to hold 
individuals in contempt. In February 1906, a Tennessee state criminal trial found 
“Johnson, a colored man,” guilty of “rape upon a white woman” and sentenced him to 
death.245 Johnson’s attorneys appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit for a writ of habeas corpus.246 Although the Court of Appeals denied a 
writ, Justice Harlan ordered the state to “stay” Johnson’s execution until the Court 
could determine the merits of the habeas appeal.247 Shortly after Harlan’s order, a 
sheriff colluded with white citizens to enable a mob to murder Johnson.248 In response, 
the justices unanimously agreed to hold a contempt trial against the sheriff, the jailer, 
and several other officials including the state trial judge.249 These men appealed 
against the Court’s assertion of its contempt jurisdiction.250 The Court resoundingly 
determined that it possessed jurisdiction to hold persons in contempt regarding any 
issue that it possessed jurisdiction over, and, because the Court determined its own 
jurisdiction, the acts or omissions of the persons responsible for Johnson’s murder 
could be found contemptuous.251 When read to its logical extent, one could find that 
the Court implied that it possessed almost unlimited contempt authority. 
Contempt appeals continued when Taft became Chief Justice. In 1923, the Court 
determined in Craig v. Hecht that a single appellate judge could not unilaterally 
reverse a district court judge’s finding of contempt.252 In October 1919, Charles Levy 
Craig, New York City’s comptroller, published an open letter to the city’s public 
service commissioner disparaging United States District Court Judge Julius Mayer 
during a trial in which Craig was a party.253  For a two-year period, Mayer afforded 
Craig an opportunity to retract his letter, but Craig refused to do so, and Mayer ordered 
the United States Marshal, William C. Hecht, to arrest Craig for the purpose of holding 
                                                          
 243  Id. at 312. 
 244  United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563, 573 (1906). 
 245  Id. at 571. 
 246  Id. Johnson credibly alleged that a mob had intimidated his attorneys and that African-
Americans had been excluded from service on the jury. Id. For the later decision in this case, 
see United States v. Shipp, 214 U.S. 386 (1909). 
 247  Shipp, 203 U.S. at 571. 
 248  Id. 
 249  Id. 
 250  Id. at 572-73. 
 251  Id. at 574-75. 
 252  Craig v. Hecht, 263 U.S. 255, 279 (1923). In theory, this decision left open the possibility 
that a single appellate judge could “stay” an imprisonment for contempt until the full court of 
appeals heard and decided the appeal. 
 253  Id. at 268. 
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a contempt trial.254 Ultimately, Mayer sentenced Craig to sixty days in jail and a fine, 
but Martin Manton a judge on the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued a 
writ of habeas ordering Craig’s release.255 The Second Circuit reversed Manton and 
determined that a circuit court judge could not, while acting singly, overturn a 
contempt decision by a grant of habeas on the basis of a writ of error.256 When Craig’s 
appeal came to the Court, Justice McReynolds, rather than Taft, authored the majority 
decision in which the justices determined that a circuit court judge serving in a singular 
capacity did not possess either the statutory or inherently constitutional authority to 
issue a writ of habeas over a person held in confinement as a result of contempt 
decision.257 The one exception to this rule would occur when the originating district 
court did not possess jurisdiction over the person held in contempt.258 Because Mayer 
possessed contempt jurisdiction over Craig, the Court concluded that Manton had 
exceeded his authority in granting habeas.259 Holmes, with Brandeis joining, dissented 
from the decision for two reasons. First, Holmes argued that Manton was within his 
authority to grant Craig habeas because Craig had been deprived of his liberty. 260 
Second, and equally importantly, Holmes considered that the First Amendment’s 
guarantee of freedom of speech served as one measure to show that it was Mayer who 
exceeded his authority.261   
Taft authored a concurrence for the purpose of reiterating that parties to a former 
litigation as well as their counsel possessed a limited right to criticize a judge without 
the fear of a contempt finding.262 Under this “doctrine,” while litigation was ongoing, 
a party could comment on the proceedings as long as the statements were not of a 
nature to undermine the fairness of the trial. Taft stressed that once a case had been 
fully adjudicated, the parties to the case were free to publicly criticize the judge.263 
                                                          
 254  Id. at 268-69. 
 255  Id. at 268-70. 
 256  Id. at 271. 
 257  Id. at 274-76. 
 258  Id. at 277. 
 259  Id. at 271. 
 260  Id. at 280-81 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 261  Id. at 281-82. Holmes penned, “A man cannot be summarily laid by the heels because 
his words may make public feeling more unfavorable in case the judge should be asked to act 
at some later date, any more than he can for exciting public feeling against a judge for what he 
already has done.” Id. Arguably, Holmes’ dissent can be considered as part of his free speech 
jurisprudence. While there is no letter or notation contained in his collections on this point, had 
his dissent been the majority, it would have narrowed. Patterson v Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 463 
(1907). This opinion, authored by Holmes, upheld the conviction of a newspaper editor who 
criticized the Colorado Supreme Court. Id. 
 262  Hecht, 236 U.S. at 278 (Taft, C.J., concurring). 
 263  Id. Taft penned: 
It is of primary importance that the right freely to comment on and criticize the action, 
opinions and judgments of courts and judges should be preserved inviolate; but it is also 
essential that courts and judges should not be impeded in the conduct of judicial 
business by publications having the direct tendency and effect of obstructing the 
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Taft was silent on a generalized right to criticize a judge prior to any known litigation, 
such as in the case of judicial appointments and elections, in all likelihood because 
such questions were not at issue. Taft also used his concurrence to criticize Craig and 
his attorneys for convincing Manton to rely on an outdated statute to exceed his 
judicial authority in overturning Craig’s conviction.264 Like Victor Berger’s appeals 
against Landis, the New York Times reported on Craig’s and Mayer’s conduct.265 
According to Alpheus Mason, one of Taft’s early biographers, Taft later lobbied 
President Calvin Coolidge to pardon Craig.266 On the other hand, Taft did not hold 
Craig in high esteem. In 1928, Taft wrote to his son Robert Taft, “Craig is the man 
who got into contempt of the court in New York, and we had to sustain the 
commitment. He is a most cantankerous fellow.”267 
                                                          
enforcement of their orders and judgments, or of impairing the justice and impartiality 
of verdicts. 
 
  If the publication criticizes the judge or court after the matter with which the criticism 
has to do has been finally adjudicated and the proceedings are ended so that the carrying 
of the court's judgment cannot be thereby obstructed, the publication is not contempt 
and cannot be summarily punished by the court however false, malicious or unjust it 
may be. The remedy of the judge as an individual is by action or prosecution for libel. 
If, however, the publication is intended and calculated to obstruct and embarrass the 
court in a pending proceeding in the matter of the rendition of an impartial verdict, or 
in the carrying out of its orders and judgment, the court may, and it is its duty to protect 
the administration of justice by punishment of the offender for contempt. 
Id. Taft’s reasoning was not unique. In 1887 the Indiana Supreme Court held in Cheadle v. State 
that while a citizen was free to criticize a judge after a trial had ended, speech that was calculated 
to, or had the potential to affect the outcome of the trial could be the basis for a contempt 
conviction. Cheadle v. State, 11 N.E. 426, 431 (1887). In 1890, the California Supreme Court 
expanded this doctrine to include newspaper coverage of a trial. See, e.g., Ex parte Barry, 85 
Cal. 603, 608 (1890). Barry appears to have been significantly narrowed, if not eviscerated by 
the Court in Pennekamp v. State of Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 349 (1946). 
 264  Hecht, 236 U.S. at 279. Taft instructively wrote: 
Instead of pursuing this plain remedy for injustice that may have been done by the trial 
judge and securing by an appellate court a review of this very serious question on the 
merits, they sought by applying to a single judge of only coordinate authority for a writ 
of habeas corpus to release the petitioner on the ground that the trial judge was without 
jurisdiction to make the decision he did. This raised the sole issue whether the trial judge 
had authority to decide the question, not whether he had rightly decided it. 
Id. 
 265  Craig Loses Appeal From Jail Sentence: Higher Court Holds Judge Manton Had No 
Power to Issue Habeas Corpus Writ, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 1923), 
http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-
free/pdf?res=940DE2D91339E133A25750C2A9639C946395D6CF; Craig Contempt Case 
Moves Ahead, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 1923), http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-
free/pdf?res=9405E1DB1639EF3ABC4850DFB5668389639EDE. 
 266  ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT: CHIEF JUSTICE 144 (1964). 
 267  Letter from William H. Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Robert A. Taft, son 
of William H. Taft (May 6, 1928) (on file in the Library of Congress). Craig seems to have had 
a combative history with judges. In 1919, a New York state trial judge held him in contempt. 
See Court Fines Craig $250 for Contempt, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 1919), 
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In 1925, the Court issued two decisions further shaping the judiciary’s contempt 
authority. By the time Taft became chief justice, he was concerned with two aspects 
of the judicial contempt authority that he believed, if left unchecked, could enable a 
tyrannical judiciary, particularly in light of Shipp.   
The first decision arose from a challenge to the President’s power to pardon a 
convicted person. The Constitution expressly grants to the President the authority to 
pardon a person convicted of crimes, and since the nation’s founding, presidents had 
pardoned persons judicially convicted of contempt.268 On November 24, 1920, Judge 
Kenesaw Landis issued an injunction against Philip Grossman, a Chicago barkeep.269 
The injunction was basically a judicial order to Grossman to desist from serving 
alcohol in violation of the Volstead Act, and Landis issued it at the behest of the 
Department of Justice.270 Grossman violated the injunction and continued to sell 
liquor.271 He was prosecuted for contempt, found guilty, and sentenced to a year in 
prison and a one thousand dollar fine.272 He remained free from prison on bail while 
he appealed his conviction.273 In December 1923, President Coolidge commuted 
Grossman’s sentence to the fine, and after Grossman paid the fine, Coolidge pardoned 
him.274 The Chicago Daily Tribune, excoriated Coolidge for the pardon.275 In response 
to the pardon, United States District Court Judge James Herbert Wilkerson, who had 
replaced Landis after Landis resigned his judgeship to become the fulltime 
commissioner of baseball, ordered Grossman into confinement.276 Grossman 
challenged Wilkerson’s order in district court, and a two-judge panel consisting of 
Judge George Albert Carpenter and Wilkerson determined that the judicial contempt 
power was not “subject to the good will of the executive.”277 Although Wilkerson and 
Carpenter were confronted with an issue of first impression, their decision represented 
a significant judicially imposed constraint on the Executive Branch.278 
                                                          
http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-
free/pdf?res=9400E5DF123BEE32A25757C0A9649D946896D6CF. 
 268  Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 108 (1925). 
 269  See United States v. Grossman, 1 F.2d 941, 942 (D.N.D.Ill. 1924); see also He Must Go 
to Jail to Win His Freedom, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 26, 1923), 
http://archives.chicagotribune.com/1923/12/26/page/1/article/he-must-go-to-jail-to-win-
freedom. 
 270  National Prohibition Act, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305, 314 (1919). 
 271  Grossman, 267 U.S. at 107. 
 272  Id. 
 273  See Grossman, 1 F.2d at 942. 
 274  Grossman, 267 U.S. at 107. 
 275  For Sale: 1 Nice Pardon: Apply Philip Grossman, CHI. TRIB. (May 17, 1924). 
 276  Grossman, 267 U.S. at 107. 
 277  Grossman, 1 F.2d at 943. 
 278  Id. at 943. Wilkerson in a concurrence argued: 
If the President has the power to grant the pardon in this case, what becomes of the 
sanctity of decrees against confiscatory acts of the agents of government, state and 
national? What becomes of injunctive orders under the interstate commerce, antitrust 
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On May 2, 1924, Landis appeared before the Senate’s Extraordinary Investigation 
Committee.279 During his testimony, Landis disavowed any knowledge that he 
provided a newspaper the following quote: “Just why may we expect $1,800 a year 
probation agents to stand up four-square for law enforcement with the President 
granting a pardon.”280 However, in his personal correspondences, it is clear that he 
permitted an interview with the Hearst International Newspaper Syndicate on 
February 6, 1924, and criticized Coolidge’s pardon to Grossman.281Initially, the Senate 
                                                          
and kindred statutes? What becomes of the authority of the courts to protect the citizen 
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed to him by the Constitution, against irreparable 
injury to life and property? It was well said that the power to tax is the power to destroy; 
it is just as true that the power to pardon for contempt is the power to destroy judicial 
authority. 
Id. at 954. Of note, Taft later became critical of Carpenter’s judicial acumen. He asked Judge 
Evan Albert Evans, a Woodrow Wilson appointee on the Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit to investigate Carpenter. See Letter from William H. Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme 
Court, to Evan A. Evans, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (Apr. 9, 1928) 
(on file in the Library of Congress). Evans responded: 
Since 1916 I have heard almost constant complaints about Carpenter’s work. These 
came from district judges, the district attorney, and numerous trial lawyers. These 
complaints generally include indifference and inattention to duties and an absence of 
required industry. The criticisms have increased each year. Last fall it nearly reached 
the boiling point over which the associate district attorney made oral complain to Judge 
Alschuler. I am satisfied the complaints are justified . . .  Judge Carpenter does not seem 
to cooperate. He has a marked aversion for critical cases and common-law actions. The 
parties complain that he only sits a half day when he has a jury trial and often an hour 
late when he opens his court. 
Letter from Evan A. Evans, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, to William 
H. Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Apr. 5, 1928) (on file in the Library of Congress). 
 279  Investigation of Honorable Harry M. Daughtery, Formerly Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 
Hearings Before the Select Comm. on Investigation of the Attorney Gen., U.S. S., Sixty-Eighth 
Cong., First Session, Pursuant to S. Res 157, Directing a Comm. to Investigate the Failure of 
the Attorney Gen. to Prosecute or Defend Certain Criminal and Civil Actions, Wherein the 
Gov’t is Interested, 68th Cong. 935-55 (1924) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Kenesaw M. 
Landis). 
 280  Hearings, supra note 279, at 935-55; PIETRUSZA, supra note 59, at 218. Newspapers 
carried Landis’ testimony, and typical of headlines was the Reading Eagle’s Saloon Man’s 
Pardon Puzzles Judge Landis, READING EAGLE, May 2, 1924, at 30; see also Senate Calls 
Landis in Sift of Rum Pardon: Ex Judge to Tell of Grossman’s Case, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 30, 1924); 
Daugherty is Target in Plan of Senators for Criminal Action, TOLEDO BLADE (May 8, 1924). 
 281  Letter from Kenesaw M. Landis, Judge, Northern District of Illinois, to Louis R. Glavis, 
Employee, U.S. Dept. of the Interior (Feb. 6, 1924) (on file with the Kenesaw Landis Papers in 
the Chicago Historical Society). Landis wrote to Glavis, 
It is the pulling and hauling process by political gentlemen in a position to elect 
delegates to a convention that will choose a successor to the official who temporarily 
happens to be exercising the pardon power that discredits the whole thing . . . You will 
understand these observations are only by way of suggestions to you and are not to be 
quoted. This is solely because when I get ready to talk about this fraud again, I shall 
want to choose my own language. I can only repeat to you that I think the Grossman 
pardon was dishonestly induced. 
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committee was not focused on Coolidge’s pardon to Grossman, although Landis 
attempted to steer the committee in that direction. Rather, the committee centered its 
attention on corruption in the Justice Department under Attorney General Harry 
Daugherty.282 Taft became furious with Landis over his testimony because he believed 
that no judge, or former judge, should openly criticize the sitting President over an 
issue the judge had presided over.283 Interestingly, Coolidge distrusted Attorney 
General Daugherty and had asked a willing Taft to privately encourage Daugherty to 
resign.284   
In Ex Parte Grossman, Taft authored a unanimous decision in which the Court 
determined that the presidential “pardon power” applied to federal criminal contempt 
convictions.285 He observed that presidential pardons had been issued against contempt 
convictions during the previous eighty-five years without appeal.286 However, Taft 
realized that this fact alone was hardly dispositive to the constitutional issue in front 
of the Court, and he reached to British common law predating the Constitution 
regarding the monarchal authority to pardon contempts for the purpose of articulating 
that the presidential power to pardon was simply an extension of British practice.287 
Taft then turned to the Constitutional Convention of 1787 in which the participants 
determined that the only bar to the exercise of the pardoning power was in regard to 
impeachments.288 Led by Taft, the Court decided that all other “offenses against the 
United States” were within the scope of the power to pardon.289 Taft conceded, as 
Wilkerson and Carpenter had pointed out, that the term “crimes and misdemeanors” 
were clarified by the Court in 1812 in United States v. Hudson and Goodwin290 to 
mean only those acts which Congress prohibited and that had a punishment affixed by 
statute to the prohibition.291 However, he countered that “offenses against the United 
States” were not exclusive to crimes and misdemeanors because the contempt 
authority had evolved since the Constitution’s enactment.292 
To Taft, the most important aspect to the decision appears to have been a question 
relating to the Constitution’s separation of powers. Wilkerson and Carpenter had 
concluded that the Executive Branch’s exercise of the pardon power undermined the 
                                                          
Id. Although there appears to be no evidence of collusion between Landis and Hearst, it does 
appear suspicious that Hearst’s newspapers had attacked Taft at this time. 
 282  See generally Hearings, supra note 279, at 935-55. 
 283  PIETRUSZA, supra note 59, at 215. 
 284  WILLIAM A. COOK, KING OF THE BOOTLEGGERS: A BIOGRAPHY OF GEORGE REMUS 85 
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Taft’s “conduit” to Harding. 
 285  Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 121 (1925). 
 286  Id. at 118-19. 
 287  Id. at 111. 
 288  Id. at 112.  
 289  Id. 
 290  United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. 32, 34 (1812). 
 291  Grossman, 267 U.S. at 114. 
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35Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2017
352 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:317 
 
Judicial Branch.293 Taft countered that the lifetime tenure of judges and the 
constitutional prohibition against diminishing judicial salaries served as a check 
against arbitrary presidential action.294 Tellingly, after noting other constitutional 
checks against each of the federal government’s branches, he emplaced into the 
decision the following phrase:   
[W]hile the Constitution has made the Judiciary as independent of the other 
branches as is practicable, it is, as often remarked, the weakest of the three. 
It must look for a continuity of necessary cooperation, in the possible 
reluctance of either of the other branches, to the force of public opinion.295   
Taft cited no case law for this statement, but it was a strong indication that he believed 
the Judicial Branch should be constrained in using its authority. In contrast to its 
excoriation of Coolidge, the Chicago Daily Tribune favorably reported on the decision 
with the headline “President Can Pardon Guilty of Contempt.”296 
Before the Court granted certiorari in Grossman, Taft spoke to the student body 
of Columbia University’s law school.297 His speech, titled “Our Chief Magistrate and 
his Powers,” reflected a book Taft first published in 1916, but was later published by 
the university in a significantly lengthened format.298 Although the speech centered on 
the President’s authority as Commander in Chief, he analyzed the relationship 
between the judiciary’s contempt authority and the President’s authority to pardon:   
There is a question whether the President’s power of pardon extends to the 
case of one sentenced to imprisonment for contempt by a federal court . . . 
It is objected that this power of contempt is used by the court to enforce his 
judgments and that if the President could intervene and paralyze the 
instrument in the hand of the Court to enforce its judgment, he would not 
be pardoning crime, but would be obstructing the Court in its administration 
of justice.299   
Taft then evidenced how he would decide Grossman by articulating that in instances 
where a court issues a contempt sentence to “vindicate its own authority,”—e.g., a 
criminal contempt—the President had a constitutional power to issue a pardon.300 
One day before hearing argument in Grossman, Taft complained to his daughter 
that, because of low judicial salaries, there were too many judges “who are failures in 
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the profession and who never would be thought of, but for the lack of real timber.”301 
Taft did not directly implicate Landis as part of the problem of judicial competency or 
a lack of ethics, but this is not surprising because Landis had already left the bench to 
become baseball commissioner.302 Taft placed this criticism alongside the comment 
that the Court had “heard some important cases, and we are going to hear some more 
in these coming weeks.”303 Contemporaneously, he wrote to Senator Augustus Stanley 
of Kentucky, “While it was essential to give to the Court greater control over its own 
docket to determine cases of Constitutional importance, trust should also be given to 
the Court to police the judiciary.”304 Grossman reflects the Court exercising a 
“policing power” over the lower judiciary’s assertions of its own authority, and it is, 
at a minimum, circumstantially coincidental that Taft, as previously noted in regarding 
the establishment of a judicial conference, was at the same time trying to convince 
Congress that the Court had to play a greater role in regulating the federal judiciary. 
One week after listening to the arguments in Grossman, Taft informed his son Charles, 
“[The Court had] been pushing along through a docket of select cases and [has] had 
three very important constitutional questions put to us. One as to whether the President 
can pardon contempts under the Volstead Act.”305 He similarly expressed the 
constitutional importance of Grossman to his brother Horace and emphasized that the 
Volstead Act was not a constraint on the President’s pardon authority.306 
While the Court in Grossman recognized the existence of a constitutional check 
against contempts, in Cooke v. United States,307 the justices placed an implied 
constitutional constraint on the judicial contempt authority. Taft also authored the 
unanimous decision in Cooke, and it was issued almost contemporaneously with 
Grossman.308 Cooke arose from an appeal against a contempt conviction in the U.S. 
District Court for the Northern District of Texas.309 In 1923, Judge James C. Wilson 
                                                          
 301  Letter from William Howard Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Helen Herron 
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 302  See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 303  Letter from William Howard Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Helen Herron 
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 305  Letter from William Howard Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Charles P. Taft, 
son of William Howard Taft (Dec. 7, 1924) (on file in the Library of Congress). 
 306  Letter from William Howard Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Horace D. Taft, 
brother of William H. Taft (Dec. 7, 1924) (on file in the Library of Congress). The day before 
the Court issued Grossman, Taft complained to his son Robert that the Court was going to issue 
forty opinions and could only dedicate two minutes to the decision. Letter from William Howard 
Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Robert Taft, son of William Howard Taft (Mar. 1, 
1925) (on file in the Library of Congress). 
 307  Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 537 (1925). 
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adjudged attorney Clay Cooke and his client, J.L. Walker, guilty of contempt.310 J. 
Frank Norris—a leading minister on the side of Prohibition and against the teaching 
of evolution—had criticized Wilson for siding with “wets” against prohibitionists and 
the Ku Klux Klan in 1922.311 Walker was a defendant in a series of bankruptcy suits 
involving his grain storage company, and after losing the first case, Cooke attempted 
to have Wilson recuse himself from the other pending trials.312 Unlike Victor Berger, 
Cooke did not file a formal affidavit with the court and instead instructed Walker to 
deliver a personal letter to the judge.313 Cooke’s letter was intemperate. He not only 
accused Wilson of bias against Walker, but also added, “I had believed that Your 
Honor was big enough and broad enough to overcome the personal prejudice against 
the defendant Walker, which I knew to exist, but I find that in this fond hope I was 
mistaken.”314 
On February 26, 1923, Wilson directed the marshal to arrest both Walker and 
Cooke and commenced a criminal contempt proceeding.315 Cooke appeared before 
Wilson and motioned the court to grant a continuance in order to prepare for the 
contempt trial, but Wilson refused to grant a delay.316 Wilson also denied Cooke the 
ability to present mitigating evidence, including the fact that he had written the letter 
on the advice of another legal counsel.317 During the contempt proceeding, Wilson 
accused Walker of employing a private detective to attempt to bribe the jury foreman 
in his bankruptcy trial, and Wilson linked this accusation as proof that Cooke’s letter 
was intended to be contemptuous.318 Wilson sentenced both Cooke and Walker to jail 
for thirty days and to pay a five hundred dollar fine.319 The U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit reversed Walker’s conviction, but it upheld Cooke’s conviction and 
sentence.320 
Taft began the decision by observing that had Cooke merely intended to provide 
notice to Wilson that he did not want to file a formal affidavit, such a notice would not 
have constituted contempt.321 Instead, Taft determined that Cooke intended to 
“characterize in severe language, personally derogatory to the judge, his conduct of 
the pending case.”322 Taft next delineated why Wilson should have recused himself 
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from the contempt hearing. He noted that Cooke’s private conduct was not tantamount 
to an act in open court such as when a witness or spectator causes a disturbance, and 
therefore, the judge is not intended as a victim of the contempt.323 In instances where 
this occurs, Taft recognized that a judge must act quickly for a “summary vindication” 
of the “court’s dignity and authority.”324 Moreover, as Taft pointed out, unlike Ex 
Parte Terry, in which the contempt occurred in open court, Cooke had the letter 
privately delivered to Wilson.325 Coupled with the fact that Wilson refused to permit 
Cooke and Walker time to prepare their defense and did not formally advise them of 
the charges, Taft determined that the contempt procedure failed due process.326 
Equally important, Taft led the unanimous Court to apply the right to an impartial 
judge to contempt trials by strongly advising that on remand, Wilson should ask the 
senior judge of his district assign another judge.327  
IV. IMPARTIAL JUSTICE:  TUMEY V. OHIO 
Legal historian Daniel Kyvig has noted that after the Civil War, Ohio was the 
center of the temperance movement.328 The most powerful political organization 
dedicated to Prohibition, the Anti-Saloon League, originated in Cleveland in 1895.329 
In one of the first challenges to the Eighteenth Amendment, Hawke v. Smith,330 the 
Court concluded that Ohio’s method of bypassing a referendum by the voting 
population and reserving to the state legislature the authority to vote on the 
Amendment was constitutional.331 The Ohio Constitution mandated that the state’s 
votes to amend the U.S. Constitution could only occur by a general referendum, yet 
the U.S. Constitution enabled Congress to determine on an amendment-by-
amendment basis whether the amendatory processes would occur by state legislatures 
or by the general votes.332 The Court easily resolved the issue by finding for the 
supremacy of Congress over the Ohio legislature and then applying the plain text of 
                                                          
 323  Id. at 534. 
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 325  Id. 
 326  Id. at 537. 
 327  Id. at 539. Taft placed the following language into the decision: 
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Article VI to define the term legislature as a voting body elected by a state’s voting 
process.333 
  A. Tumey’s Background 
Despite the Prohibition aspects to Edward Tumey’s appeal, Tumey is certainly not 
a narrow decision on the efficacy of liquor courts or prohibition enforcement. Had the 
Eighteenth Amendment not come into being, an appeal involving the relationship 
between pecuniary interest and the right to an impartial judge might have come to the 
Court during Taft’s tenure eventually. Early in the nation’s history, state legislatures 
enabled the creation of inferior courts, in part, to reduce the amount of work conducted 
by trial judges.334 Inferior courts generally did not have the authority to convict a 
person of a felony, and such courts usually assessed fines rather than jail sentences.335 
But some of these courts were only able to function through the collection of fines, 
and judicial salaries as well as police salaries were likewise contingent on the 
collection of fines.336 
The Supreme Court generically upheld the constitutionality of inferior courts in 
1917 in Hatranft v. Mullowny, Judge of the Police Court of the District of Columbia.337 
In 1919, in Pacific Gas & Electric Company v. Sacramento, the Court determined that 
sentences adjudged by juryless “inferior courts” did not violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 338 In 1899, the city of Sacramento enacted an ordinance which required 
transportation companies to “sprinkle water” along track-ways to reduce airborne dust 
and grime.339 A local gas company operated an inter-city street railway but refused to 
comply with the ordinance, and the city’s “inferior court” assessed a fine against the 
company’s directors.340 The California Court of Appeals determined that the exercise 
of the state’s “police power” was inherently constitutional and that the state legislature 
possessed the authority under California’s Constitution to delegate this police power 
to municipalities.341 The Court did not take exception to the state court’s analysis.342 
Thus, along with the social, economic, religious, and political forces underlying 
Prohibition, the origins of Tumey should also be considered in light of the “police 
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power” conferred on the states, as this power was upheld in both Hantraft and Pacific 
Gas and Electric. That is, Ohio’s use of inferior courts as a means of enforcing both a 
federal and state prohibition was not per se unconstitutional. 
It is also necessary to understand Ohio’s inferior court construct at the time of 
Tumey. In the first quarter of the twentieth century, Ohio’s inferior court structure 
could be characterized as a “hodge-podge” system of trial courts. The state’s supreme 
court supervised not only two courts of appeal, courts of probate, and county trial 
courts, but also justice of the peace courts, police courts, municipal courts, and 
mayors’ courts.343 The state was divided into eighty-eight counties containing 753 
villages and 110 cities.344 Hamilton County, where Tumey lived and where North 
College Hill exists, had a population of 589,356 people across its 407 square miles.345 
Cincinnati, the county’s most populous city had a population of 541,160, while North 
College Hill had a population of 4,139.346 
Shortly after the Volstead Act, Ohio’s legislature enacted a statute that enabled 
municipalities to fund prohibition enforcement through the collection of fines 
adjudged in juryless inferior courts.347 Ohio’s law permitted the creation of municipal 
“liquor courts” throughout the state but not in major metropolitan centers.348 
Apparently, the state legislature concluded that such “liquor courts,” when placed 
outside of the state’s major cities, created an effective cordon to prevent alcohol from 
entering cities where the police were unenthusiastic about enforcing Prohibition.349 In 
1919, North College Hill issued an ordinance that created a “liquor court.”350 The state 
laws and the town’s ordinance enabled fines and seizures of private property to be 
used to fund not only the costs of the court and law enforcement, but also costs to 
supplement the income of judicial officers, marshals, deputies, and prosecuting 
attorneys.351 In various localities, including North College Hill, elected mayors served 
as inferior court judicial officers.352 Ohio was not, however, a state bereft of judicial 
ethics. The Ohio legislature had enacted a code requiring judicial recusal in cases in 
which a judge had a vested interest in the outcome.353 The legislature did not 
specifically include inferior courts or mayors serving in a judicial capacity in this 
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code.354 On the other hand, in 1917, the Ohio Supreme Court decided that although 
liquor courts were “inferior courts,” persons adjudged guilty in such courts had the 
right to appeal.355 Thus, as of 1925, it remained an open question as to whether a liquor 
court judge’s denial of a motion for recusal was appealable to the state trial courts or 
courts of appeal. 
North College Hill’s mayor, A.R. Pugh, also served as the town’s sole liquor court 
magistrate and during the court’s two year existence, he received over six hundred 
dollars from the fines assessed against defendants.356 In 1925, Pugh led an alcohol raid 
that resulted in law enforcement officers entering local carpenter Edward Tumey’s 
house, where they discovered illicit alcohol.357 This raid led to Tumey’s prosecution 
in the municipality’s liquor court.358 Of the one hundred dollar fine assessed against 
Tumey, Pugh collected only twelve dollars.359 Tumey preserved an appeal by objecting 
to Pugh’s service as a judge on the basis that Pugh was an interested party who had a 
pecuniary interest in the outcome of the trial.360 After all, if Tumey were acquitted, 
Pugh would receive no monies. 
Tumey appealed to Judge Stanley Struble on the Court of Common Pleas, and in 
cutting language, Struble reversed Tumey’s conviction and fine.361 A 1988 
biographical article described Stuble as “a teetotaler but not a prohibitionist” and went 
on to note that Tumey was a local carpenter and not a notorious bootlegger.362 The 
author of the biographical article also reported that Struble was angry with law 
enforcement officials for arresting and prosecuting working citizens instead of 
focusing on well-known gangsters.363 Another character aspect of Struble is that he 
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appears to have been popular with southern Ohio’s ethnic German population for 
defending the teaching of the German language during World War I.364 One could 
conclude that Struble was concerned about the due process rights of minorities and 
individual citizens against Ohio’s assertion of its “police power.” 
Struble determined that because Pugh and others benefited from convictions, 
Tumey was deprived of the right to due process of law.365 Midway through the 
decision, he penned: 
The power and authority given of making of mayors of villages special 
instruments in the enforcement of prohibition was bad enough, but 
considering this in connection with what has been done in other ways for 
prohibition enforcement, we are forced to conclude that we have a situation 
that seriously menaces the liberties of the people.366   
Although his disgust with the state’s prohibition enforcement scheme appeared 
throughout the decision, Struble carefully analyzed due process in light of not only 
state constitutional law, but also the common law predating the Constitution.367 Pugh 
had argued that because a liquor court could not assess a sentence of imprisonment, it 
was a lesser court, immune from the requirement of a jury trial and, therefore, the rules 
governing recusal did not apply.368 Struble countered that persons who were unable to 
pay a fine would be placed in prison to work off the fine at a rate of sixty cents per 
day, and a person could be confined for nine years after being found guilty of a second 
offense.369 Struble cited to Schick v. United States370 for the proposition that because 
violations of both the Volstead Act and Ohio’s prohibition laws were rooted in the 
Eighteenth Amendment, Tumey’s offenses were of a constitutional magnitude and, 
therefore, could not be considered as a petty offense akin to public swearing.371 
Struble next discounted Pugh’s argument that because the Ohio legislature had 
exempted mayors in the judicial ethics statutes by omission, Pugh was free to ignore 
Tumey’s objection to his service as a judicial officer.372 Because the state constitution 
listed a series of inalienable rights, including the right to seek redress in the courts, 
Struble found that Pugh had an obligation to at least consider whether he had a duty 
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to disqualify himself in light of Tumey’s due process rights but had not done so.373 
Pugh relied on an 1881 Ohio Supreme Court decision which had determined that the 
term “pecuniary interest” did not include a dependency on “court cost” to supplement 
income.374 He argued that his collection of a share of the assessed fines was not, alone, 
a basis for mandatory recusal.375 Struble distinguished Tumey’s appeal from the 1881 
decision because Pugh had collected for his own use a greater amount of money than 
simply the costs of running the court.376 Ohio’s First District Court of Appeal reversed 
Judge Struble’s ruling with little comment, and the Ohio Supreme Court refused to 
grant Tumey a further appeal.377 
Then, Tumey appealed for a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court, and Taft 
convinced the other eight justices that the appeal was of a constitutional magnitude.378 
Although Taft did not, in any of his surviving correspondences, discuss his view of a 
judicial system that relied on mayors or justices of the peace to conduct criminal trials, 
in his 1916 Kentucky Law Review article, he had disparaged the system of lesser courts 
and observed that such courts were weighted against the rights of the nation’s poor.379 
Perhaps presaging the Court’s grant of certiorari to Tumey’s appeal, Taft insisted that 
the best means to achieve a fair and equitable system of lesser courts was to ensure 
that the Supreme Court had the jurisdictional authority to take appeals from the 
decisions of such courts.380 
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.701 (1926). 
 378  Barry Cushman, Inside the Taft Court: Lessons from the Docket Books, 2015 SUP. CT. 
REV. 345 (2016). 
 379  Taft, supra note 79, at 21. Taft penned: 
We have had through the country a system of civil courts conducted by men who are 
not lawyers, by justices of the peace, with appeals from the justice's court to the common 
pleas court, or superior court of first instance, and then with appeals through 
intermediate courts of appeal to the Supreme Court. If a system could be devised that 
offered greater advantage to the wealthy litigant in resisting the claims of the poor 
litigant, I don't know what it is. 
Id. 
 380  Id. Taft urged that 
[t]he justices of the peace generally have very little knowledge of the law, are not men 
of skill and learning, able to dispose of business promptly and accurately, and so the 
cases too frequently drag along in the so-called "people's courts" until the poor litigant 
is discouraged and really defeated, even when he wins in a court of last resort. The 
poorer people are entitled to as good judges as the rich, and they cannot get them by 
giving them an appeal to the highest court in their cases, because that involves such 
delay and expense. The cutting off appeals from the people's courts to the Supreme 
Court is one means of preventing that inequality between the poor and the rich litigant 
that now prevails. 
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  B. Tumey v. Ohio:  The Decision 
On appeal to the Court, some of the nation’s most powerful prohibition advocates 
represented the state of Ohio. The team included Attorney General Charles C. Crabbe, 
Wayne Bidwell Wheeler, Edward B. Dunford, D. W. Murphy, and Charles M. 
Earhart.381 Wheeler was the president of the Anti-Saloon League, a national 
organization with chapters in all forty-eight states, and he was instrumental in forming 
a powerful congressional alliance to enable the Volstead Act.382 In 1922, Senator John 
Shields, a Tennessee Democrat, accused Wheeler of supporting Taft’s efforts to 
empower the Supreme Court to temporarily assign district court judges to other 
districts when vacancies occurred or when district caseloads became untenable for a 
hidden purpose of bringing “avowed dry judges into wet territory.”383 This accusation 
was the opposite the Anti-Saloon League’s accusations against Taft. Dunford was the 
national Anti-Saloon League’s vice president.384 Earhart was the president of the Ohio 
Anti-Saloon League.385 And, Murphy was a state prosecutor who had campaigned for 
the Eighteenth Amendment.386 There is a historic consensus that Wheeler was 
instrumental in the election defeats of Senators Atlee Pomerene of Ohio and Owlsey 
Stanley of Kentucky in 1922.387 
Crabbe’s representation of Ohio is explained by his duties as Attorney General and 
that Ohio did not yet have a state solicitor general. Wheeler and the other 
prohibitionists, however, are a different matter. Historian Daniel Okrent, in his Last 
Call:  The Rise and Fall of Prohibition, described Wheeler as a powerful political 
force who was instrumental in the Eighteenth Amendment’s passage and who was also 
a force in reshaping the Ohio legislature.388 He represented the Ohio legislature in 
Hawke v. Smith and advocated in other prohibition suits before the Court.389 Wheeler 
                                                          
Id. 
 381  However, the names of the state’s attorneys are note listed on the decision. See CLEMENT 
E. VOSE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE:  AMENDMENT POLITICS AND SUPREME COURT LITIGATION 
SINCE 1900 97 (1972). 
 382  OKRENT, supra note 108, at 39. 
 383  MASON, supra note 266, at 101. 
 384  SIGMA PHI EPSILON, THE SIGMA PHI EPSILON JOURNAL 232 (1921). 
 385  THE PHI DELTA THETA FRATERNITY, THE SCROLL OF PHI DELTA THETA, VOL. XXXIV 417 
(1910). 
 386  THE RAILROAD COMMISSION OF OHIO, REPORT TO THE RAILROAD COMMISSION OF OHIO 
TO THE GOVERNOR 70 (1911). 
 387  OKRENT, supra note 108, at 229. 
 388  Id. at 39. 
 389  Wheeler also filed an amicus brief in Lambert v. Yellowly, 272 U.S. 581 (1926), a 
decision in which the Court determined that Congress had the power to prohibit the use of 
alcohol in prescription medicines, Cunard v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100 (1923), which determined 
that Congress had the authority to extend the Eighteenth Amendment’s prohibitions to foreign 
vessels using United States ports, and, The National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350 (1920). 
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and Taft had known each other for at least five years before Tumey.390 In 1922, 
Wheeler led the Anti-Saloon League to openly support Taft’s efforts to increase the 
number of district court judges after its leaders had initially opposed Taft’s plan.391  In 
1923, Taft lauded Wheeler to his brother Horace in writing, “Wheeler is a man of real 
power and great common sense.”392 One year later, Attorney General Harlan Fiske 
Stone inquired to Taft about whether Roscoe J. Mauck, an Ohio judge on the state 
court of common pleas, was a reasonable candidate to be nominated for a federal 
judgeship.393 Mauck, unfortunately, had appeared drunk in public prior to the 
Eighteenth Amendment, but the Anti-Saloon League had later lauded his decisions in 
upholding the Crabbe Act, and he did not oppose prohibition measures during the state 
Republican Convention in 1924.394 Taft replied to Stone that he had sought out 
Wheeler’s opinion to determine whether the Anti-Saloon League would oppose 
Mauck and that Wheeler conveyed back to him “that while at the state convention 
[Mauck] had kept straight, he was very much afraid that given the independence of a 
position on the Federal Bench in the larger cities, Mauck might yield again, to 
liquor.”395 In January 1926, Wheeler felt comfortable enough to ask Taft to lobby the 
justices against narrowing Ohio’s conspiracy laws in a pending appeal unrelated to 
Tumey’s.396 
By late 1926, Taft’s view of Wheeler appears to have changed. In November, 
shortly after the parties submitted their initial briefs to the Court but before argument, 
the Anti-Saloon League published an article about the Chief Justice which claimed 
that he had opposed exempting beer and light wines from the Eighteenth Amendment 
“because it would leave a hole through which a coach and four could be driven and 
the effectiveness of the law destroyed.”397 Taft, in fact, had given a newspaper 
                                                          
 390  Letter from Wayne Wheeler, President, Anti-Saloon League, to William Howard Taft, 
Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Aug. 26, 1922) (on file in the Library of Congress). 
 391  Id. 
 392  Letter from William Howard Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Horace D. Taft, 
brother of William Howard Taft (Nov. 11, 1923) (on file in the Library of Congress). The 
remainder of Taft’s comment regarding Wheeler is: 
He is miles away from the pestiferous Anderson, the head of the Anti-Saloon League in 
New York, who has brought much discredit on the movement. I do not doubt Wheeler 
sees the great advantage of using the Civil Service Commission to get good men into 
the prohibition department, but I presume that in order to hold his position among 
Congressmen he has found it necessary not to be active in that particular direction, 
because his activity would be a sin against the Holy Ghost, with the ordinary 
congressman and senator. 
Id. 
 393  Letter from William Howard Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Harlan F. Stone, 
Attorney General (Dec. 7, 1924) (on file in the Library of Congress). 
 394  Id. 
 395  Id. 
 396  Letter from Wayne B. Wheeler, President, Anti-Saloon League, to William Howard Taft, 
Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Jan. 26, 1926) (on file in the Library of Congress). 
 397  Letter from William Howard Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Horace D. Taft, 
brother of William H. Taft (Nov. 12, 1926) (on file in the Library of Congress). 
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interview in late 1918, while serving as a Yale law professor, in which he had made 
this comment, but he had done so for purposes other than supporting a stricter 
prohibition amendment.398 Taft instead argued that the law had to be entirely 
prohibitory or not exist at all, because exceptions for beer and “light” wines would 
make the amendment unenforceable.399 Taft complained to his brother Horace, “One 
of the features of the fight over prohibitionists and anti-prohibition is the utter 
unscrupulousness of both sides in the use of evidence.”400 Wheeler attempted to assure 
Taft that he had nothing to do with the Anti-Saloon League’s article and wrote the 
chief justice a formal apology.401 
On March 6, 1927, when Taft wrote to his son Charles that the Crabbe Act was 
unconstitutional, he also noted that the decision “necessitated an examination of 
English and American law” and was disappointed in both Wheeler and Tumey’s 
counsel, Edward Moulinier.402 He further wrote, “The truth is that the case was not 
fully prepared on either side.  We required them to go back and file new briefs, and 
after that, we found that there was a great deal of work to be done by the Court.”403 
What Taft did not mention is that Wheeler and Mouliner were both late on their briefs, 
and they filed a total of four apiece.404 Wheeler argued to the Court that because the 
Fourteenth Amendment did not require trials by jury, state legislatures were free to 
create courts as deemed necessary.405 Wheeler added that because several states, since 
the beginning of the nation, had permitted judges to keep adjudged fines as part of 
their salary, due process did not prohibit this practice.406 The state’s third and final 
argument was that the fine collected from Tumey was miniscule and, therefore, not 
worthy of the Court’s time.407 
Taft began the decision by narrowly fashioning the question before the Court. The 
Court addressed the narrow issue of whether Ohio’s scheme of permitting a mayor to 
serve in a judicial position in which the mayor possessed a pecuniary interest in the 
outcome of the trial failed due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.408 Following 
                                                          
 398  Id. 
 399  Id. 
 400  Id. 
 401  Letter from Wayne B. Wheeler, President, Anti-Saloon League, to William Howard Taft, 
Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Nov. 12, 1926) (on file in the Library of Congress); Letter 
from William Howard Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Wayne B. Wheeler, 
President, Anti-Saloon League (Nov. 13, 1926) (on file in the Library of Congress). 
 402  Letter from William Howard Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Charles P. Taft, 
son of William H. Taft (Mar. 6, 1927) (on file in the Library of Congress). 
 403  Id. Little is known about Edward Moulinier. He was a local Ohio attorney who fought 
against the Crabbe Act. See Edward Moulinier, Fought Prohibition, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1951, 
at 92. 
 404  Wayne B. Wheeler, President, Anti-Saloon League, to William Howard Taft, Chief 
Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Dec. 18, 1926) (on file in the Library of Congress). 
 405  Tumey v. State of Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 534 (1927). 
 406  Id. 
 407  Id. 
 408  Id. at 514-15. 
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this question, he detailed the various Ohio statutes and municipal ordinances that 
created the North College Hill court. Then, he went on to note that between May 11, 
1923, and December 31, 1923, the town court collected over $20,000, of which Mayor 
Pugh received $696.35.409 The county marshals, inspectors, detectives, and other city 
and county employees received $2,697.75 while a prosecutor received $1,769.50.410 
Had the hundreds of trials resulted in acquittals rather than convictions, none of this 
money would have been available to pay the various officials involved in the 
enforcement of Prohibition.411 Taft also recognized that prior to Tumey’s trial, Pugh 
had made public statements which could be construed in favor of maintaining the 
liquor court.412 
Next, Taft articulated a basic rule that judicial officers and persons acting in a 
judicial capacity must be disqualified from adjudicating a controversy in which they 
have a pecuniary interest.413 He cited to no federal judicial precedent for this principle, 
but rather he turned to several state judicial decisions, all of which arose from civil 
matters such as land use, probate, and debt collection. Two of these decisions 
originated from railroad interests in private property. One case Taft highlighted was a 
Michigan appellate decision in which jurors empaneled on a judgeless probate court 
voted to assign an intestate decedent’s land for railroad use, but the jurors were 
shareholders in the railroad and stood to benefit from the assignment; therefore, the 
trial failed due process.414 The second decision Taft highlighted, and in his opinion, 
the most important because it arose in Ohio, was Gregory v. Cleveland, Columbus, & 
Cincinnati Railroad Company.415 In 1855, the Ohio Supreme Court upheld a lower 
court’s determination that commissioners appointed to assess a property owner’s loss 
of property resulting from a taking of land for the purpose of railroad track 
construction could not have a pecuniary interest in the railroad company.416 
Specifically, two of the commissioners were stockholders in the defendant railroad 
                                                          
 409  Id. at 516-22. 
 410  Id. 
 411  Id. 
 412  Id. at 521. 
 413  Id. 
 414  Id. (citing Peninsular Country R.R. v. Howard, 20 Mich. 18 (1870). In this decision, the 
Michigan Supreme Court noted: 
The maxim that no man shall be judge in his own cause, is one deeply rooted in the 
common law, and can never be overlooked anywhere, where impartial justice is one of 
the objects of judicial administration. And in this special proceeding for taking the 
property of individuals against their will, in which the jury act in effect as judges, in the 
absence and beyond the control of the Court, we think this maxim is applicable to them 
as well as judges. 
Id. at 25. 
 415  Gregory v. Cleveland, Columbus, & Cincinnati R.R. Co., 4 Ohio St. 675 (1855). 
 416  Id. at 677. 
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company; therefore, they had a motive to undervalue the loss of property.417 The state 
justices stated, “No man should be the judge in his own cause.”418 
It might appear, at first glance, that Taft wanted the decision to be applied narrowly 
to only financial issues because, after noting the state decisions involving the necessity 
of judicial disqualification in matters of a pecuniary nature, he pointed out that not all 
questions of judicial disqualification involved “constitutional validity.”419 In contrast 
to financial questions, Taft concluded, “[M]atters of kinship, personal bias, state 
policy, remoteness of interest, would seem generally to be matters merely of 
legislative discretion.”420 To this end, Taft cited to Wheeling v. Black,421 a West 
Virginia decision in which that state’s supreme court determined that the state 
legislature had the authority to enact a statute to prevent judicial officers from being 
disqualified on the basis of also being tax-payers.422 In Wheeling, a West Virginia 
municipality sued a former tax collector after claiming that the collector had 
wrongfully withheld tax payments from the municipality and kept the monies for his 
own enrichment.423 The trial judge was a taxpayer to the municipality, and his salary 
derived from the collection of taxes.424 The state supreme court did not consider the 
municipality’s appeal on the basis of due process; rather, the court considered whether 
the state legislature had the lawful authority to enact an anti-disqualification statute.425 
Moreover, very little of the state supreme court’s decision focused on recusal; instead, 
the state court spent much of the decision considering the collector’s evidentiary 
objections as well as a petition for a change in forum.426 
                                                          
 417  Id. 
 418  Id. at 677. The state court went on to note: 
We think, for the administration of justice, the safe way is, in all cases, for interested 
judges to decline acting in such cases; and where it appears, on the record, that they 
were interested, and acted on questions of fact, and especially when they were to select 
the jury who try the facts, they should refuse to sit, and make known their interest at the 
earliest stage of the proceedings. 
Id. at 679. 
 419  Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927). 
 420  Id. 
 421  Wheeling v. Black, 25 W. Va. 266, 270 (1884). 
 422  Id. at 279. The statute read:  
No judge of any court, and no sheriff or other officer of a court, shall be disqualified 
from performing his official duties with respect to any cause by reason of the fact that 
he is a citizen and tax-payer of a county, district, school district, or municipal 
corporation which is interested in, or a party to such cause. 
W. VA. CODE § 51-3-6 (1881). 
 423  Wheeling, 25 W. Va. at 270. 
 424  Id. at 280. 
 425  Id. at 282. 
 426  See generally id. 
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Prior to Tumey, the nation’s state and federal courts had not issued a dispositive 
decision on the nexus between kinship and recusal. In terms of family relationships or 
personal bias, Taft believed that either state legislatures or the judicial profession itself 
were the proper instruments for regulating judicial conduct in matters of kinship.427 
Taft was concerned with appearances, but he also did not want to criticize the past 
practices of the Supreme Court. In 1933, Justice Van Devanter informed Chief Justice 
Charles Evans Hughes that in Tumey, Taft approached kinship in a cautious manner 
because he did not want to impugn the legacies of other justices.428 According to Van 
Devanter, Taft explained that during and after the Civil War, noted attorney David 
Dudley Field argued appeals to the Court while his brother Stephen Field was a 
justice.429 Justice Field was, in fact, particularly concerned about his judicial service 
during Lambdin Milligan’s appeal because his brother David argued Milligan’s appeal 
to the Court.430  Apparently, Taft had personal reasons for believing that, although 
there was an appearance of impropriety in Justice Field’s service on appeals where his 
brother argued, it was appropriate to permit the state courts and legislatures to develop 
rules regarding recusal and disqualification.431 
After disposing of questions regarding kinship, personal bias, state policy, or 
remoteness of interest, Taft turned to ancient rules involving the need for an impartial 
judiciary as related to pecuniary interests. He did so as a response to Ohio’s assertion 
that in order to determine the parameters of due process under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Court had to: 
[L]ook to those settled usages and modes of proceedings existing in the 
common and statute law of England before the emigration of our ancestors, 
which were shown not to have been unsuited to their civil and political 
condition by having acted on them after the settlement of this country.432   
                                                          
 427  Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927). 
 428  Letter from Willis Van Devanter, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Charles Evans 
Hughes, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Oct. 7, 1935) (on file in the Library of Congress). 
 429  Id. 
 430  Letter from Justice Stephen J. Field to Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase (June 30, 1866), in 
THE SALMON CHASE PAPERS, Vol. V, 115-17 (John Niven et al. eds., 1998). Ironically, perhaps, 
is the example set not only by Justice Field and merely touched upon by Chief Justice Taft that 
would later prove vexatious to the Supreme Court. For instance, future Justice Abe Fortas 
provided legal advice to Justice William O. Douglas including negotiating a book contract for 
Douglas in 1947, but Douglas did not recuse himself from cases in which Fortas argued. See 
LAURA KALMAN, ABE FORTAS:  A BIOGRAPHY 164-65 (Yale Univ. Press ed., 1990). Although 
Professor Kalman did not address Tumey in her study on Fortas, she noted that by the mid-
twentieth century relationships between judges and litigants had evolved into a public issue. See 
id. In 1946 Justice Jackson publicly criticized Justice Hugo Black for participating in a case 
where Black’s former law partner from over two decades earlier represented a party. See, e.g., 
WILLIAM WIECEK, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE BIRTH OF THE 
MODERN CONSTITUTION:  THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, 1941-1953, Vol. XII, 414-16 
(Stanley N. Katz ed., 2006). 
 431  See infra note 433. 
 432  Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523. The Ohio solicitor general’s brief cited to Ownbey v. Morgan, 
256 U.S. 94 (1921), a property attachment and seizure decision and Murray’s Lessee v. 
Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272 (1855), a land ejectment decision. Neither of 
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Taft noted that during the reign of Richard II, justices of the peace were paid for their 
services out of common sheriffs’ funds, and the payment was a flat rate regardless of 
whether the justices of the peace convicted or acquitted a person.433 Although parties 
to a lawsuit in medieval England were subject to the rule of “amercement pro falso 
clamore,” a term denoting that the losing party had to pay the costs of a lawsuit, judges 
and other judicial officers were not paid on the basis of their decisions.434 Taft 
summarized the importance of this practice: “There was at the common law the 
greatest sensitiveness over the existence of any pecuniary interest however small or 
infinitesimal in the justices of the peace.”435 Read in its context and given Taft’s 
conservatism, it appears that Taft found it important that the laws confining English 
justices of the peace to salaries remained the law of England.436 
Taft lamented that Ohio, Arkansas, Kentucky, Nebraska, North Carolina, 
Maryland, Georgia, and Texas had disregarded the English standard and permitted 
“inferior” judicial officers’ salaries to be paid from the collection of fines.437 However, 
judicial officer salaries in Maryland were “fixed,” and while contingent on the 
collection of fines, a judge did not increase his or her salary by the numbers of 
convictions.438 Both Texas’ and Georgia’s highest appeals courts had upheld the basic 
construct of permitting fines to be used for judicial officer salaries.439 In Bennett v. 
State, the Texas Court of Appeals, in a very brief decision arising from a defendant’s 
challenge against a misdemeanor judge, simply held that the Texas legislature had 
                                                          
these two decisions arose from an appeal challenging the competency of a judicial officer to 
determine a cause of action. 
 433  Id. at 521. Taft may have oversimplified his reliance on British legal history regarding 
judicial salaries. English judges could also collect fees from parties for their service as 
adjudicators though such fees were paid regardless of the judicial decision. Also, because 
judicial salaries often went unpaid, it was not unusual for judges to receive land grants and 
pensions from large landholding aristocrats. See, e.g., WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH ET AL., A 
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, VOL. I 252-54 (Nabu Press ed., 1922). 
 434  For a history of this rule in the United States, see Lowe v. Kansas, 163 U.S. 81 (1986) 
(discussing that Kansas law allows for prosecutors who engaged in malicious prosecution to be 
subject to court costs after a specific finding of such by a jury upheld); Day v. Woodworth, 54 
U.S. 563 (1852) (finding it constitutional that a plaintiff may be responsible for court costs); 
John D. Lawson, The Action for the Malicious Prosecution of a Civil Suit, 30 AM. L. REG. 281, 
364 (1882). See generally Robert W. Taylor, Restraints on Vexatious Litigation, L. MAG. & 
REV. 670, 676 (1875). 
 435  Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523. Scholars who analyzed Caperton have overlooked Taft’s belief 
that common law barred the judicial conduct at issue in Tumey. See, e.g., Andrey Spektor & 
Michael Zuckerman, Judicial Recusal and Expanding Notions of Due Process, 13 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 977, 986 (2011).  
 436  Tumey, 273 U.S. at 521. 
 437  Id. at 526. 
 438  Id. at 527 (citing Herbert v. Baltimore County Comm’r, 55 A. 376 (Md. 1903); In re 
Application of J.D. Guerrero, 10 P. 261 (Cal. 1886)). 
 439  See generally Wellmaker v. Terrell, 3 Ga. App. 791 (1908); Bennett v. State, 4 Tex. Ct. 
App. 72 (1878). 
51Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2017
368 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:317 
 
mandated that the payment of judicial salaries was contingent on convictions.440 The 
defendant had been convicted of operating a betting parlor, and the judge fined him 
fifty dollars.441 The Texas court did not provide any due process analysis as to the 
statute and, instead, focused on the judge’s adherence to a statute rather than whether 
the statute was unconstitutional.442  
In Wellmaker v. Terrell, the Court of Appeals of Georgia, in a lengthier analysis, 
concluded that the payment of fees collected from parties in lieu of fixed judicial 
salaries was not unconstitutional.443 The city of Barnseville, in conformance with 
Georgia law, established an inferior court, and the judge assigned to the court also 
served as a judicial clerk.444 Wellmaker had paid a bond to the court for the release of 
a citizen accused of larceny while the citizen awaited trial.445 The citizen fled from the 
district, and Wellmaker forfeited the bond money.446  He appealed the forfeit on the 
basis that because the inferior court judge would only be paid if the citizen had been 
convicted; the court possessed no jurisdiction over the bond.447 Unlike Texas, Georgia 
law prohibited a judge from adjudicating a cause of action in which he had a pecuniary 
interest.448 However, the state court of appeals determined that judicial payments based 
on fines collected did not fall within the ambit of “pecuniary interest.”449 Also, the 
Georgia court, like its Texas counterpart, deferred to the legislature noting:  
As we cannot conclude that the General Assembly of 1899 intended not to 
create the court, which it solemnly declared it was creating, as well as on 
account of the other reasons to which we have referred, we are constrained 
to hold that the judge of the city court was not disqualified to preside in the 
case now before us.450 
Taft approvingly noted that the California, Florida, Louisiana, and South Carolina 
state constitutions prohibited judicial officers serving in minor courts to be paid from 
the collection of fines and mandated judicial salaries from the state, regardless of 
whether defendants were convicted or acquitted.451 However, Taft returned to the 
question of the application of common law to the issue of impartiality, and this resulted 
in the somewhat disjointed nature of the decision.452 He pointed to several state 
                                                          
 440  See Bennett, 4 Tex. Ct. App. at 72-73. 
 441  Id. at 73. 
 442  See generally id. 
 443  See Wellmaker, 3 Ga. App. at 796. 
 444  See id. at 793. 
 445  See id. at 791. 
 446  See id. at 793. 
 447  See id. 
 448  See id. 
 449  Id. at 796-97. 
 450  Id. at 798. 
 451  See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 528 (1927). 
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decisions in which citizens who happened to be taxpayers were deemed to be 
incompetent to serve as jurors in a suit involving the municipality in which they 
resided.453 On the other hand, he accepted that a taxpayer interest could be considered 
remote to the point of not requiring disqualification.454 To Taft, the issue of juror 
competency served as an important analog to the status of inferior judges because 
inferior judges served as a trier of fact. From this analysis, he concluded that Ohio’s 
argument that the common law permitted inferior judges to collect fines as a salary 
had no basis.455 Taft quickly dispatched the state’s final argument that Tumey had been 
fined the minimum amount permissible under law after being adjudged guilty by the 
overwhelming weight of the evidence. Taft responded to this argument by noting that 
a party’s right to an impartial judge was more important.456  In other words, the amount 
of the fine was not pertinent to right to an impartial judge. 
  C. Kinship: The Taft Family 
The decision’s “kinship” statement is noteworthy beyond Van Devanter’s 
recollection of Taft’s reasoning to Chief Justice Hughes. In 1925, the voters of 
Hamilton County, Ohio elected Taft’s son, Charles Phelps Taft II, as their county 
prosecutor.457 The younger Taft had promised the county’s electorate that he would 
vigorously prosecute bootleggers and violent criminals, and Taft was intensely proud 
of his son. 458 In August of that year, Taft wrote to Justice Sutherland, “My younger 
boy, Charles P Taft, 2d has just been nominated for Prosecuting Attorney of Hamilton 
County, where Cincinnati is. This is a very important position and one which offers 
an opportunity that is quite unusual at his age of twenty-nine.”459 Taft described his 
son’s campaign:  “He was at the head of the citizens’ organization in the primary 
against the regular organization. They had an election at which there were 60,000 
votes, and it was hotly contested. Charlie won by 1,000 votes. [It was close so there 
had to be a recount].”460 
From the end of 1925 through the Court’s issuance of the decision, Taft maintained 
an ongoing correspondence with his son about prohibition enforcement. Contained 
within their letters is the fact that Judge Struble had sworn Charles into practice as a 
prosecutor in late November 1925 and that Taft wrote a letter to Struble not only 
thanking the judge for his kind words for his son, but also lauding Struble for his 
                                                          
 453  Id. at 529 (citing Divieny v. City of Elmira, 51 N.Y. 506 (1873); Corwein v. Hames, 11 
Johns 76 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1814); Fine v. St. Louis Pub. Sch., 30 Mo. 166 (1860); In re New 
Boston, 49 N.H. 328 (1870)). 
 454  See Tumey, 273 U.S. at 531. 
 455  Id. at 535. 
 456  Id. 
 457  STEPHEN HESS, AMERICA’S POLITICAL DYNASTIES:  FROM ADAMS TO CLINTON 332-33 
(Brookings Inst. ed. 2016). 
 458  Id. 
 459  Letter from William Howard Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to George 
Sutherland, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Aug. 25, 1926) (on file in the Library of 
Congress). 
 460  Id. 
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decision in Tumey’s appeal.461 Taft’s letters to Struble cannot be found in either his 
very large collection or that of his son, and Struble did not leave any historic repository 
of his papers. But, on January 4, 1927, Charles wrote to his father: 
I just have time to enclose a copy of remarks Judge Struble made at my 
swearing in ceremony, although I did not expect him to say anything in 
particular. I think he would appreciate a letter from you and I should like 
to have you return this copy to me when you have read it.462   
Taft, in turn responded to Charles two days later, “I am returning herewith the 
stenographic copy of the remarks of Judge Struble at your induction in office. The 
judge was very kindly in the language he used. I shall be glad to write him a letter and 
say so.”463 On January 17, Charles informed his father that Struble “was tremendously 
pleased and has been showing it to everybody.”464 
On March 12, 1927, Charles informed his father that the Supreme Court’s decision 
was widely lauded throughout the state.465  Charles wrote, “You may have had the idea 
before this that you were popular in your own state, but if you did not, you need now 
revise your ideas.”466 Charles further praised his father, “I think that statues of you will 
probably be erected in every city in Ohio. In fact, your glory is being reflected in the 
name of Taft no matter who bears it, and I feel that if you were to run again now for 
any office, it would secure a two-third majority.”467 In spite of this exchange, Tumey 
should not be considered as evidence that Taft believed there were too many 
prosecutions or that the problem of crime was overstated. 
Both the Chief Justice and his son believed that there were significant increases in 
crime not only in Hamilton County or Ohio, but also in the nation at large. In August 
1927, Taft wrote to Charles that he was concerned with the “Cincinnati crime wave” 
and understood that the failure to stop bootlegging, prostitution, and murder would 
cripple confidence in the government.468 Taft noted to his son, “The immunity of these 
bootleggers, due to the original conspiracy which prevents and terrorizes the natural 
witnesses of the crime, is something I presume they have had in other parts of the 
country.”469 He further mentioned: 
                                                          
 461  Id. 
 462  Letter from Charles P. Taft, son of William Howard Taft, to William Howard Taft, Chief 
Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Jan. 4, 1927) (on file in the Library of Congress). 
 463  Letter from William Howard Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Charles P. Taft, 
son of William Howard Taft (Jan 9, 1927) (on file in the Library of Congress). 
 464  Letter from Charles P. Taft, son of William Howard Taft, to William Howard Taft, Chief 
Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Jan. 17, 1927) (on file in the Library of Congress). 
 465  See letter from Charles P. Taft, son of William Howard Taft, to William Howard Taft, 
Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Mar. 12, 1927) (on file at the Library of Congress). 
 466  Id. 
 467  Id. 
 468  Letter from William Howard Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Charles P. Taft, 
son of William Howard Taft (Aug. 7, 1927) (on file in the Library of Congress). 
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There is nothing to do but just keep at it, employ more detectives, if you 
need them, and after a while you will begin to get the thread and then you 
will have a collection of crimes with convictions that will break the thing 
up, but it needs hard work and the closest investigation.”470   
In July 1927, Taft complained to Charles that one of the problems with prohibition 
enforcement was that Congress had underfunded the Treasury Department so that 
there were too few agents to enforce the federal laws.471 In a matter unrelated to 
bootlegging or Ohio but contemporaneous with his discussion of Ohio’s law 
enforcement problems, in this same letter to Charles, Taft criticized noted defense 
counsel Clarence Darrow, as well as advocates to abolish the death penalty.472 
Although Charles believed that Tumey was so popular that it would pay political 
dividends, it did not. He became well known for prosecuting George Remus, a 
Cincinnati bootlegger who possessed political power in the state and had murdered his 
own wife.473 However, a jury found Remus not guilty because of temporary insanity, 
and this harmed Charles’ reputation.474 On July 25, 1928, Taft informed Sutherland:  
[M]y son Charlie, the one who tried the Remus case, is running for office 
again and has a primary on the 14th of August. He has a very decided 
opposition, because the primary involves a charter or reform ticket and the 
regular ticket. I have felt considerable doubt as to his success.475   
                                                          
 470  Letter from William Howard Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Charles P. Taft, 
son of William Howard Taft (Aug. 7, 1927) (on file in the Library of Congress). 
 471   Letter from William Howard Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Charles P. Taft, 
son of William Howard Taft (July 9, 1927) (on file in the Library of Congress). 
 472   Id. Taft’s letter read in part: 
I don’t agree with the opponents of capital punishment at all. I think that 
those who commit crimes of violence in robbery are directly affected by the 
fear of capital punishment, and that it leaves the public helpless to abolish 
that as the extreme penalty . . . This man Darrow, who came very near being 
convicted of suborning perjury, is a great advocate of the abolition of the 
death penalty.  I can not understand what the vogue is which makes him so 
popular a lecturer. One can understand why he is opposed to capital 
punishment, because it is his business to oppose it. I think the escape of 
those two young Jews who tortured that other young Jew to death is one of 
the greatest miscarriages of justice that we have had, in that it did not result 
in their execution. 
Id.  In this letter, Taft was referring to the Leopold and Loeb trial in Chicago. 
 473  COOK, supra note 284, at 130-38. 
 474  Id. at 167-69. 
 475  Letter from William Howard Taft, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to George 
Sutherland, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (July 25, 1928) (on file in the Library of 
Congress). 
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Charles failed in his efforts to be reelected and left electoral politics for a decade.476 
He would, however, be elected as Cincinnati’s mayor and be active in state politics.477 
On March 8, 1927, the Cincinnati Enquirer reported that the Ohio legislature 
praised Taft and Cincinnati’s city government feted Struble as a local hero.478 Struble, 
for his part, claimed the Court’s decision was a “rebirth of liberty.”479 The same day, 
the Chicago Tribune in a headline, which read “Village Mayor Loses Rum Fine Fee,” 
reported that the Court’s “opinion is considered of unusual importance as it may be 
interpreted to affect fee officers all over the country.”480 The newspaper also noted that 
Taft was from the same county in which the appeal arose.481 The Baltimore Sun noted, 
under a headline titled “Fee Splitting held Illegal by Court,” that Maryland’s traffic 
enforcement laws would have to change because the county magistrates who served 
over traffic ordnance courts earned their salaries by convictions.482 Given the laudatory 
reporting, one might have thought that Taft considered Tumey as the Court’s “final 
say” on the matter of recusal and disqualification of judges. However, this was not the 
case. Within a year, the Court accepted an appeal and issued a decision that provided 
clarity to Tumey’s reach regarding challenges based on pecuniary interest.483 Just as in 
Tumey, the new appeal arose from a liquor court conviction in Ohio.484 The Court in 
Dugan v. Ohio determined that the mayor of the city of Xenia was not required to 
recuse himself from the town’s liquor court proceedings because his salary was 
generically based on the township’s ability to raise revenue through a variety of means, 
including the collection of fines.485 The mayor’s salary originated from a general fund 
based on monies accumulated through general fines, but the salary remained the same 
whether a defendant was acquitted or convicted.486 In a brief unanimous decision, the 
Court held that where a judicial officer is paid a regular salary through a general fund, 
there is no direct pecuniary interest in the outcome of trials; therefore, the judge is 
assumed to be impartial.487 
                                                          
 476  Joseph Treaster, Charles P. Taft, Former Mayor of Cincinnati, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 
1983), http://www.nytimes.com/1983/06/25/obituaries/charles-p-taft-former-mayor-of-
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 481  Id. 
 482  Fine Splitting Held Illegal by Court, BALTIMORE SUN, Mar. 8, 1927 at 5. 
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 V.  CONCLUSION:  CONTEMPORARY USE OF THE DECISION AND AN ARGUMENT FOR 
INCORPORATING JUDICIAL INTENT IN THE FUTURE 
In a 2007 law review article referencing Tumey, a federal judge observed, “One 
wonders how coincidental it was, but in 1927—just three years after the ABA adopted 
its Canons—Chief Justice Taft authored a seminal opinion for the United States 
Supreme Court.”488 The answer to this “wonder” is that there is no coincidence 
between the establishment of the 1924 Canons of Ethics and Tumey. From the time 
Taft became Chief Justice until his death on March 8, 1930, Taft shaped a 
jurisprudence emphasizing the importance of an impartial judiciary in all of the 
nation’s courts. 
There remains a question noted in the introduction:  Can the legal history of Tumey, 
beginning with Chief Justice Taft’s intent, apply to appeals beyond pecuniary interest 
considerations without undermining the integrity of the decision? Although the answer 
is yes, perspective on this question may be found in the Burger Court’s deliberations 
on a 1972 pecuniary interest case.489 Notwithstanding Dugan, there were a number of 
unanswered questions regarding the full meaning of pecuniary interest, but it was not 
until over four decades passed that the Court would attempt to provide clarity to this 
meaning.490 In Ward v. Village of Monroeville,491 a majority of the Court interpreted 
Tumey as extending to salaries of judicial officers that relied on an indirect system of 
fine collections. That is, the city government of Monroeville, Ohio relied on the 
collection of traffic fines to fund roughly half of its operating budget.492  In an almost 
analogous replay forty-five years after Tumey, the Court determined that Ohio’s 
system of traffic enforcement violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause.493 In an opinion authored by Justice William Brennan, the majority determined 
that because mayors were permitted to serve as inferior judges and the revenue raised 
from traffic enforcement that paid into a municipality’s funds, in turn, paid a mayor’s 
salary, the trial process could not withstand constitutional scrutiny.494 The majority did 
not cite to Tumey as a dispositive decision, but the justices acknowledged that the Ohio 
                                                          
 488  Judge Peter W. Bowie, The Last 100 Years: An Era of Expanding Appearances, 48 S. 
TEX. L. REV. 911, 918 (2007). 
 489  Ward v. Vill. of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972). 
 490  Id. 
 491  Id. 
 492  Id. at 57. The Court noted: 
Thus, in 1964 this income contributed $23,589.50 of total village revenues of 
$46,355.38; in 1965 it was $18,508.95 of $46,752.60; in 1966 it was $16,085 of 
$43,585.13; in 1967 it was $20,060.65 of $53,931.43; and in 1968 it was $23,439.42 of 
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threatened its loss, the village retained a management consultant for advice upon the 
problem. 
Id. 
 493  Id. at 60. 
 494  Id. 
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Supreme Court did so.495 The difference between Tumey and Ward was that in Ward 
the mayor’s fixed salary was directly dependent on the municipality’s maintenance of 
revenue from traffic ordnance violations, but unlike in Tumey, the mayor’s salary 
could not fluctuate based on the numbers of convictions.496 The majority noted not 
only that Ohio’s municipalities were generally dependent on traffic fines for the bulk 
of revenue, but also that it was a common practice for the municipal police to charge 
suspected offenders under their ordnances rather than under state law because once 
charged under state law, all revenue raised from fines went to the state’s revenue 
coffers.497 The Ohio traffic statute enabled a defendant to challenge judicial officers 
for partiality on a case-by-case basis, but this statutory construct placed a burden of 
proof on individual defendants rather than providing a universal safeguard.498 Unlike 
in Tumey, neither party requested an oral argument to the Court although the Court 
ordered argument on October 17, 1972, in part, because the initial briefs were 
lamentably bereft of constitutional analysis.499 Ward is a brief five-page decision for 
the majority, and the dissent, authored by Justice Byron White and joined by Justice 
William Rehnquist, consists of two paragraphs.500 White insisted that Tumey was “not 
controlling,” because the mayor in Ward had “no direct financial stake in its 
outcome.”501   
The brevity of the decision is not indicative of the Court’s deliberations on the 
appeal or its use of Tumey. For instance, Justice Potter Stewart, an Ohioan, informed 
Brennan that the decision, like Tumey, would have considerable impact throughout the 
state.502 Moreover, Stewart argued that the decision should have enabled mayors to 
accept guilty pleas in instances where a fine was “fixed and mandatory.”503 Originally, 
Chief Justice Warren Burger assigned the opinion to Brennan as a per curiam decision, 
                                                          
 495  Id. at 59. Three Ohio justices dissented. Blackmun penned into his personal notes, “[T]he 
very fact that the Ohio Supreme Court split 4 to 3 is indicative to me of the closeness of the 
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1972) (on file with the Papers of Justice Harry A. Blackmun in the Library of Congress). 
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but because of the two dissenting justices, the decision listed the individual justices.504 
Justice Blackmun’s notes indicate that the majority debated the applicability of Tumey 
to Ward’s appeal.505 Blackmun interpreted Tumey as standing for two propositions. 
First, that because Mayor A.R. Pugh directly and personally benefitted from finding 
Edward Tumey guilty, he was an interested party in the trial.506 Second, Pugh had a 
“personal interest in the fiscal soundness” of North College Hill, and “fines 
substantially contributed to that soundness.”507 Blackmun acknowledged that Taft had 
led the Court in Tumey to the proposition that not all instances in which a mayor’s 
executive function and judicial functions were intertwined resulted in a due process 
violation.508 This is why, Blackmun believed, that Taft had clarified Tumey with 
Dugan. However, because of “the sizeable dependency of the village upon its traffic 
fines and the mayor’s responsibility for the village’s good fiscal condition,” Blackmun 
concluded the second proposition had been violated, and, therefore, Tumey should be 
extended to an area beyond a narrow definition of “direct pecuniary interest.”509 
Initially Justice Rehnquist intended to separately concur.510 On October 30, he 
circulated a draft concurrence in which he conceded to the majority that the process 
of challenging the partiality of mayors and seeking recusals was flawed, but then, he 
insisted that traffic courts were not entitled to the same due process standards as 
criminal trials.511 However, on January 19, 1972, he dissented by arguing that the 
majority not only wrongly expanded Tumey, but he also claimed the majority 
“undermined tens of thousands of courts similar to that of Monroeville throughout the 
country.”512 He also complained that he could not “subscribe to the Court’s action in 
summarily reversing the decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio without the further 
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file with the Papers of Justice William J. Brennan in the Library of Congress) [hereinafter 
Rehnquist, Draft Dissent]. 
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enlightenment that might come from oral argument and briefing.”513 On November 1, 
1972, Rehnquist opted to withdraw his dissent and joined with White.514 But, there is 
a feature of Rehnquist’s January 19 draft that was later parroted by Justice Scalia in 
Caperton v. A.V. Massey. Among Rehnquist’s stated reasons for dissent was a fear 
that the majority’s decision would lead to an increase in challenges against judges and 
subsequent litigation.515 In spite of Rehnquist and White’s opposition to the ultimate 
decision, the majority had crafted a decision that was consistent with Taft’s views of 
the judiciary. That is, the Court in Ward found that the means of collecting revenues 
for the payment of judicial salaries undermined public confidence in the courts.516   
Likewise, roughly two decades after Ward, a new majority followed the basic 
tenets of Taft’s jurisprudence in its 2009 Caperton decision.517 In this decision, an 
appellant had donated not only to a candidate’s campaign to unseat a sitting state court 
justice, but also had also sent $2.5 million to a political action group that campaigned 
for the judicial challenger, Brent Benjamin.518 Justice Benjamin succeeded in his 
campaign to unseat a sitting state justice.519 While there is no evidence Justice 
Benjamin financially benefitted from the decision in the case, the Court’s majority 
concluded that the donation required a judicial disqualification because of the 
appearance of a connection between Justice Benjamin and the appellant.520 In 
particular, the donation to the election occurred after an adverse trial court decision 
and during the pendency of the appeal.521 The fact that the winning party in the case 
had a $50 million verdict overturned in the favor of the party that donated to Justice 
Benjamin gave an appearance that one of the justices on the state court had been 
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“bought.”522 Then, the majority concluded that the appearance of a “bought vote” 
undermined the public’s belief in a fair tribunal.523 Given Taft’s efforts to reform the 
judiciary as an underlying feature of Tumey, the majority’s use of the decision in 
appeals arising from financial transactions comport with Taft’s intent underlying the 
decision. 
A second, and concededly more theoretical arena, involves Tumey’s application to 
restrictions on judicial behavior. Led by Scalia, the majority’s placement of the First 
Amendment over judicial efficacy in Minnesota v. White provides an example of a 
departure from Taft’s intent.524 Coupling Taft’s concurrence in Hecht, in which he 
acknowledged only a limited right of criticism against judges, with Tumey, it is 
probable that Taft would not have opposed a limited speech restriction on judicial 
campaigns. Moreover, while it is true that Taft never embraced the Brandeis/Holmes 
jurisprudence on free speech, he believed that public confidence in the judiciary was 
a key goal for the nation’s courts. It is clear that in analyzing Cooke alongside of 
Tumey, he insisted on significant restraints on judicial temptations, or at least the 
appearance of such. While Taft would have considered general criticism of the 
judiciary to be fair play, he also, based on his experience with Landis, might have 
found it permissible to limit judicial speech.  This may be one reason why he placed 
the following line in the decision: 
[E]very procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average 
man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the 
defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and 
true between the State and the accused, denies the latter due process of 
law.525   
In the recent Williams v. Pennsylvania526 decision, the majority held that a sitting state 
supreme court justice who, while serving as a prosecuting attorney, supervised 
prosecutors in a death penalty case almost thirty years earlier, had a duty to recuse 
himself from an appeal arising out of the conviction in that case. The majority, led by 
Justice Kennedy, determined that because the state supreme court justice took a 
significant part in one aspect of the death penalty trial, there was not only an 
unacceptable risk of actual bias, but also a risk that “endangered the appearance of 
neutrality.”527 Although the majority only cited Tumey once, the decision nonetheless 
embraced Taft’s intent underlying the application of Tumey to a broader use regarding 
disqualification.528   
The courts should extend a greater use of Tumey as it applies to the nexus between 
disqualification and recusal on the one side and maintaining a public, rather than a 
theoretical, conception of judicial integrity on the other. This argument, like Taft’s 
                                                          
 522  See, e.g., Jeffrey Stempel, Impeach Brent Benjamin Now? Giving Adequate Attentions to 
Judicial Impartiality, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV 1, 17 (2010). 
 523  Id. at 61. 
 524  Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 782 (2002). 
 525  Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927). 
 526  Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899 (2016). 
 527  Id. at 1908. 
 528  Id. at 1909. 
61Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2017
378 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:317 
 
jurisprudence, is not based on any appeal for judicial activism or the extension of a 
so-called “progressive jurisprudence.” Rather, it is in the application of Taft’s 
conservative intent underlying Tumey to the present issues of indirect pecuniary 
interest, the interest of a donor, and the issues of campaign speech, which “opens the 
door” to the decision’s extended application in disqualification and recusal appeals. 
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